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ABSTRACT 
 
The Tejano-Anglo Alliance: Tejanos, Ethnicity, and Politics in Texas, 1832-1865. 
(August 2008) 
Ralph Edward Morales III, B.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Joseph G. Dawson 
 
This thesis discusses the alliance between Tejanos and Anglos in Texas 
politics in the years before and during the Civil War.  To examine this era, 
original documents and correspondence from prominent Tejano and Anglo 
politicians are used, as well as military correspondence between Confederate 
officers during the Civil War.  A number of secondary sources dealing with 
Texas politics, the Civil War, ethnicity, and national identity were also consulted.  
This project begins with an examination of the antebellum conditions in 
Texas, and the political crisis which necessitated the convergence of Tejano and 
southern Democratic interests. Following this, the Civil War career of Colonel 
Santos Benavides, the most important Tejano to serve the Confederacy is 
discussed. Next, the Tejanos are placed in context with German and Irish 
immigrants during the antebellum and Civil War era.  
The major conclusion reached by this thesis is that the Tejanos fought for 
the Confederacy out of a sense of duty to their home, but also possibly because 
of patronage and pressure to assimilate into Anglo society.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 With the annexation of Texas in 1845, thousands of people of Mexican 
descent became citizens of the United States of America.1  Tejanos 
encountered a number of challenges to their status as citizens in the early 
of the American period in Texas.
years 
s Anglo 
2  From then on, and despite assurances given 
to the Mexican government by American diplomat Nicholas Trist, Mexican 
Texans faced discrimination and expulsion at the hands of their Texan neighbors 
hungry for vengeance from the Mexican War.3  Following the election of 
Abraham Lincoln in 1860, and the secession of several southern states, the 
Mexican population was forced to rethink its position relative to that of it
neighbors.  While some immigrant groups, notably most of the large German 
population of Texas, opposed secession and slavery, Mexican communities in 
Texas showed outward support for the Confederacy and for secession.4 
 Historian Jerry Thompson, in his book Vaqueros in Blue and Gray, shows 
that when the call went out from Texas governor Sam Houston to decide 
whether or not Texas would secede from the Union, most of the counties of 
south Texas which had majority Tejano populations favored secession. Two of 
these counties, Webb and Zapata, did not record a single dissenting vote for the 
Union.  It is true that there were no men of Mexican descent present at the  
_________ 
This thesis follows the style of Southwestern Historical Quarterly.  
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convention to decide on secession that opened on January 22, 1861, but there 
were representatives present from all of the counties in Texas which held an 
ethnic Mexican majority population.5  This thesis will reevaluate Thompson’s 
approach to examine how the Tejanos supported the Confederacy as the first 
step towards the foundation of Tejano/Mexican American nationalism and 
identity.6 
At the time of secession, approximately 23,200 Texans were of Mexican 
descent, out of an estimated 604,000 Texans counted by the 1860 U.S. 
Census.7  Mexican Texans turned out to enlist as the state began to prepare for 
war.  As with many Americans, Tejanos were divided amongst themselves, and 
served on each side during the war.  
Among those who volunteered for Confederate service was Santos 
Benavides.  He later rose to the rank of colonel, becoming the highest ranking 
Confederate of Mexican ethnicity.  Santos Benavides answered the call to serve 
his state on January 16, 1862 as a captain of a Texas state partisan cavalry unit, 
which was not formally attached to the Confederate Army.8 John “Rip” Ford, a 
Texas Ranger and Confederate officer, said that “The Benavides family did the 
Confederacy a great favor by declaring for her.”9  As will be evident in this 
thesis, Benavides, his family, and his men, while not being a major part of the 
war, diversified the ethnic composition of the Confederate army and provided a 
key part to the defense of Texas against Unionists, Indians and outlaws. 
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Through his actions as a military officer, Benavides earned the respect, and 
sometimes friendship, of his senior officers, all of whom were Anglos. 
 This thesis will also look at the implications of Tejano service during the 
war as a step towards Americanization.  Americanization will also be taken to 
mean Tejano-American nationalism, or identity as American citizens by Tejanos 
and Mexican Americans. The focus of this argument is that Tejanos saw the 
Confederacy as “American” since they had little exposure to the “America” that 
was defined in the East as being the northern states. I argue that Tejanos began 
to form a new identity that began to detach itself from Mexico and to start 
identifying the southern concept of what being American meant.   
Several historians offer analysis about national identity.  In his book 
Boundaries, historian Peter Sahlins examines the shift towards a national 
identity in the Cerdanya region, which lies across the Franco-Spanish frontier in 
the Pyrenees Mountains.  This thesis draws upon some of Sahlins’ analysis 
about the formation of a national identity, but will have a much tighter focus:  
Sahlins examines nearly two centuries of conflict and accommodation across the 
newly established national border between France and Spain.10  Sahlins tracks 
the creation of a national identity from 1659 through 1870 in a part of Europe 
that traditionally had been part of one country, but was eventually divided into 
two, much as Texas was divided from Mexico in 1848.   One way that Sahlins 
explains the shift in national identity involves the military service of the men of 
the Cerdanya to their new nations.  This thesis will argue that the foundations for 
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Tejano-American nationalism had their roots in the era of the American Civil 
War.  In his book Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New 
Mexico, 1800-1850, Andres Resendez links Sahlins’ argument with the question 
of national identity and the division of traditionally unified people by political 
boundaries. Of particular interest is Resendez’s description of Tejano support for 
the Texan revolutionaries in their struggle against Mexico.11 
  This thesis concludes that, although there was much conflict between 
Tejanos and Anglos during the antebellum period in Texas, there were also 
years in which the two ethnicities accommodated each other.  Several works on 
the early American period in Texas will assist in this examination.  One of the 
most important books is by historians Arnoldo De Leon and Kenneth L. Stewart 
on the antebellum conditions for Tejanos.12  For Anglo-Tejano relations in the 
antebellum period, this thesis draws upon Not Room Enough: Mexicans Anglos 
and Socioeconomic Change in Texas, 1850-1900 by Stewart and De Leon. 
These authors discuss the competition by Tejanos and Anglos in the antebellum 
period and beyond it.  The Tejano Community, 1836-1900 by De Leon is another 
important work that examines the areas of conflict and accommodation between 
Anglos and Tejanos in the antebellum period.13  Likewise, historian Gilberto 
Miguel Hinojosa investigates the changes that took place in Laredo and provides 
helpful background to the place where Benavides and his family were from.14 
Together these historians have added valuable understanding both to the origins 
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of the Tejano community in Texas and the ways in which Tejanos adapted to 
their new conditions and nationalities as Americans. 
 While Jerry Thompson, Ella Lonn, and Ralph Wooster have explored the 
role of the Benavides Partisan Cavalry Company, and later, the Benavides 
Cavalry Regiment, this thesis casts fresh light on the motivations of the soldiers.  
Furthermore, additional analysis produces reassessments about the background 
and economic standings of the troopers of the Benavides Cavalry Regiment.15 
Out of myriad of reasons why these men decided to serve the Confederacy, this 
thesis will argue that the primary motivation factor in their service was the 
defense of their homes. Although many Anglos had treated their Tejano 
neighbors with disdain by their Anglo neighbors, this thesis will argue that they 
saw the founding of the Confederacy as a way in which to ally themselves with 
their fellow Texans and show that they were as “American” as anyone in Texas.  
This thesis approaches topics from four perspectives:  that of Santos 
Benavides, his superiors, the officers in his unit and the men serving under 
them. The lack of primary sources from the Benavides Regiment is a hindrance. 
But works of scholarship on the behavior and motivation of the average soldier, 
such as James McPherson’s For Cause and Comrades and works on Tejano 
political behavior, will give insights into some of the rank and file of the 
Benavides Regiment. McPherson argues that many of the men who fought in 
the Civil War believed that they were carrying on the “Spirit of 1776”, much as 
their grandfathers did against Britain in the American War for independence. By 
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comparison, some of the Tejanos who fought for the Confederacy may also 
have drawn on a revolutionary family history to decide to take up arms. Some of 
these men doubtless had fathers or grandfathers who fought against Spain for 
Mexican independence in 1821 and against Mexico for Texan independence in 
1836.16  
 James McPherson in For Cause and Comrades addresses other 
motivations for soldiers, such as the values of patriotism, economics, opposition 
to or support for slavery, peer pressure, seeking adventure, and so on.17 
McPherson highlights these valuable concepts, and they can be used to 
evaluate Tejano wartime efforts, but he does not make mention of Tejanos or 
other Hispanics fighting during the Civil War. However, only one book has dealt 
with the Mexican Americans of Santos Benavides and his cavalry unit, Jerry 
Thompson’s Vaqueros in Blue and Gray.  Thompson also discusses some of the 
units of Mexican descent that served in the Union army, most notably the 1st 
and 2nd Texas Cavalry Regiments (Union). Thompson argues that the reason 
many of these men joined either Confederate or Union units was due to some 
connection to a rigid socio-economic-political system tied to the Mexican 
patronage system.18   
 It is important to provide additional context and background for Mexican 
Americans’ participation in the war. In his book Secession and the Union in 
Texas, historian Walter Buenger offers a brief discussion on the parts played by 
prominent and influential Mexican Texans in the secession of Texas.  In the 
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anthology Mexican Americans in Texas History, historian Miguel Gonzalez 
Quiroga examines the new occupational and social opportunities opened up to 
Tejanos during the Civil War, such as work transporting cotton to Mexico as part 
of the Matamoros trade to escape the Union naval blockade of southern ports.19  
John Denny Riley’s dissertation, “Santos Benavides: His Influence on the Lower 
Rio Grande, 1823-1891,” investigates Santos Benavides both before and after 
the war, but does not analyze the wider implications of why so many of the 
Mexican Texan population fought for the Confederacy. Riley argues that the Civil 
War created a divide between Tejanos of South Texas and Mexicans.20 Riley 
concludes that Benavides fought for the Confederacy due to his revolutionary 
background in fighting for the Federalists during the Mexican Civil War from 
1838-1840.21  Roberto Ramon Calderon’s dissertation on the political climate in 
Laredo from 1846-1900 discusses the political and economic rise of the 
Benavides family to their position of prominence before the Civil War. Calderon 
also covers the workings of the Democratic Party in south Texas before and 
during the war.22 He concludes that, during their period of prominence in Laredo, 
the Benavides family was able to attach themselves to the Democratic Party and 
use the tension with other political parties and with factions within the 
Democratic Party to consolidate their power. Lastly, Gilberto Miguel Hinojosa’s 
work A Borderlands Town in Transition: Laredo, 1755-1870 examines one of the 
places along the Rio Grande in which Tejano political participation remained 
high, even continuing past Anglo settlement in the area. Hinojosa shows that 
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Laredo made the difficult transition from Spanish to Mexico and eventually to 
American while maintaining some of its own identity. While these works did not 
intend to address the Tejano military participation during the Civil War, they do 
provide a necessary context in which to place the men that fought for the 
Confederacy.  These works also show that Tejanos had agency in deciding their 
allegiance heading into the Civil War, rather than simply being forced by events 
to pick one side or the other.23   
 Aspects of the service of Santos Benavides and other Mexican American 
Civil War soldiers remain elusive. Benavides and his men have been mentioned 
in many works, but it is apparent that a synthesis of these works is needed to 
fully comprehend the war career of Benavides and to better understand the 
reasons behind Mexican Texans’ decision to join one side or the other in the 
American Civil War. While Thompson’s work examines closely the career of 
Benavides, it is only the first step toward the greater understanding of the Tejano 
involvement in the war.  Since Thompson wrote his book in 1977, a number of 
other works examining Tejano political culture in the antebellum era have been 
written.24  These works and other research assist in reaching some new 
conclusions about the motives of Tejano leadership and their actions behind 
support of the Confederacy.  
 Historians have been disappointed by the apparent lack of primary 
sources about Mexican Americans in the Civil War. This is due in large part to 
the high level of illiteracy among Mexican American enlisted men. Thompson 
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tells his readers that illiteracy amongst Tejano soldiers, especially enlistees, 
approached 95 percent.25 Most primary sources related to the Benavides 
Cavalry Regiment come from the officers, and most of that is the 
correspondence between Santos Benavides and his commander in San Antonio, 
Colonel John Ford. Other valuable sources are the papers of unit quartermaster 
and Santos Benavides’ brother-in-law, Lieutenant John Z. Leyendecker. 26 
This thesis begins its examination on the Tejanos and the Benavides 
Regiment’s participation in the war in chapter II with the War for Texas 
Independence from 1835-1838 and the ways in which Tejanos were forced to 
adapt to the new society being formed around them.  That chapter also deals 
with the necessary political and social adaptations made by Tejanos leading up 
to the Civil War which led them to cast their lot with Southern secessionists.  It 
will also proceed to examine aspects of the units under Benavides during the 
war, and trace their remarkable wartime career, with an emphasis on the inner 
functions of the unit, taken from Leyendecker’s records.  Lastly, it will argue if 
there were fundamental differences between Tejanos and other ethnic settlers in 
Texas and other ethnic regiments during the war. That chapter will also use the 
U.S. Census records in 1870.  Using these records shows that there was little, if 
any, substantial change in the economic plight of the men who fought for the 
Confederacy. This thesis concludes that the men of the Benavides Cavalry 
Regiment fought for the Confederacy for a number of reasons, including loyalty 
to their homes, a preexisting revolutionary culture from Mexico, and for the hope 
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that service with their Anglo neighbors would normalize relations with them in 
Texas.  
 The second chapter of this thesis also will discuss Tejano-Anglo relations 
from the time of the Texas Revolution from 1832 until 1845 and the early 
American period in Texas from 1845 until 1861. This chapter will argue that 
Tejanos and Anglos were forced into roles of accommodation in certain areas, 
such Laredo, while in other areas, Tejanos were subjected to harsh exclusionary 
methods. It will show that on the road to Texas secession, Tejano political 
culture led many of them to support the Confederate States. They made this 
choice during the antebellum period, and in particular, the decade of the 1850’s, 
despite an increasing amount of political and ethnic tension between Tejanos 
and their Anglo neighbors. Chapter II also views the events leading to an 
alliance of expediency between Tejanos and Anglos which would ultimately lead 
them to an alliance during the American Civil War. It also discusses the reasons 
why Tejanos decided to serve for the Confederacy. Chapter II serves to 
introduce and discusses important figures in the road toward Americanization, 
such as Jose Antonio Navarro, Juan Cortina, and Santos Benavides. 
 Chapter II also analyzes the antebellum Tejano political culture, the 
various ways of accommodation to Anglo settlement, and the treatments of 
Tejanos by their Anglo neighbors.27  For example, a General Order distributed in 
1838 by Sam Houston dealt with the treatment of Tejanos then under the 
jurisdiction and control of Texas troops.  Houston’s order and various sources 
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left from this time beg certain questions about both Santos Benavides and his 
soldiers. This thesis will ask the question of why would Tejanos be so eager to 
serve a state which had done little but persecute them since their annexation in 
the Union in 1845 and before.  The conclusion that it reaches is that they did so 
for a variety of reasons, which will be discussed further in chapter III. 
 Chapter III of this thesis focuses on the military career of the Benavides 
Cavalry Regiment from its roots as a Texas Partisan Cavalry Company 
organized by Captain Santos Benavides.  This chapter asserts that the Tejano 
contribution, while small in comparison to other Texas units, was nonetheless 
vital to the Confederate cause within the state.  It will also seek to challenge 
certain findings of other historians in regards to Tejano participation in the war.  
Chapter III shows that a patronage system, which has been supposed by some 
historians to explain the number of Tejano soldiers, cannot explain the large 
geographical area from which these men were drawn.  It also contends that the 
Tejano soldiers had multiple motivations, such as a revolutionary background 
and willingness to defend their homes, which resulted in their decisions to fight 
for the Confederate States. Using the Compiled Service Records of the Santos 
Benavides Regiment, the soldiers came from a wide area of South and Central 
Texas. This will help dispute the claim by Thompson that men were drawn to the 
Benavides Regiment out of duty to a patron, as not all of the men, certainly not 
those from as far away as San Antonio, could have known Benavides.28 
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 Chapter IV discusses aspects of ethnicity among settlers in Texas from 
the Texas Revolution to the end of the American Civil War.  This chapter will 
demonstrate how Tejanos compare, and are in contrast to, other ethnic settlers 
in Texas. It will analyze why Tejanos, as opposed to some Germans, were 
willing to fight for the Confederacy.29 Chapter IV will also compare the conditions 
under which both ethnic groups were treated. This chapter will place the 
Benavides Cavalry Regiment within the larger context of other ethnic regiments 
to serve with both Union and Confederate armies, most notably those regiments 
drawn from Irish communities in both the North and South.30 This chapter 
argues that many of the misgivings that Anglo Americans in the mid-nineteenth 
century had in regards to the Irish were also applicable to Tejanos.  Finally, this 
thesis will assert that the Civil War era was the beginning of an American 
national identity within the Tejano community in South and Central Texas.   
 This thesis will contend that Tejano service to the Confederacy during the 
American Civil War was among the first steps to the creation of a Mexican 
American identity.  It also draws a contrast with the conclusions by historian 
Jerry Thompson that indicate that Tejanos served out of a perception of 
economic gain and subservience to a Patron class.  It will conclude that Tejanos 
service in the American Civil War was done out of loyalty to their new nation and 
to their homes.   Lastly, it will establish that the misgivings that Anglos had 
towards Tejanos, both ethnically and militarily, were also exhibited towards Irish 
and German immigrants.    
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Endnotes 
 
1 Robert A. Calvert, et al., The History of Texas (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 
2002), 117, 126. 
2 In this thesis, I use the word Tejano to describe a person of Mexican heritage 
who was born or had permanent residence in Texas.  The term is used primarily 
because that is how a Mexican-American resident of Texas in 1832 and on 
would identify themselves.  Mexicano will be used to describe someone of 
Mexican birth and citizenship. 
3 Ibid., 112.  
4 Anne Bailey discusses German anti-slavery sentiment in Invisible Southerners: 
Ethnicity in the Civil War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006). There, 
She mentions that the German populace itself was divided on the slavery issue, 
with many of the Fourty-Eighters, or those who participated in the abortive 1848 
revolution in Germany, being decidedly against it, while Germans who had 
immigrated before 1848 were at the very least indifferent towards it.  
5 Jerry D. Thompson, Vaqueros in Blue & Gray (Austin: Presidial Press, 1977; 
reprint, Austin: State House Press, 2000), 11. 
6 Tejano-American nationalism, or identity as American citizens by Tejanos and 
Mexican Americans will also be taken to mean “Americanization.”  
7 Calvert, et al., History of Texas, 117, 120.  
8 “Compiled Service Record of Santos Benavides” in Compiled Service Records 
of Confederate Soldiers who Served in Organizations From the State of Texas, 
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Microfilm from Texana Collection, San Antonio Public Library. Hereafter referred 
to as C.S.R. 
9 John S. Ford as quoted in Walter Buenger, Secession and the Union in Texas 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 90.  
10 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). On 267, Sahlins states that 
ethnically similar people in the French and Spanish Cerdanya identified 
themselves by the political boundary in the Pyrenees Mountains as either 
French or Spanish. This thesis argues that the same process begins in south 
Texas during the American Civil War. The process, as Sahlins argues, was an 
ongoing and gradual one. The same claim is made by Riley.  
11 Andres Resendez, Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and 
New Mexico, 1800-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
12 Arnoldo De Leon and Kenneth L. Stewart, Not Room Enough:  Mexicans, 
Anglos and Socioeconomic Change in Texas, 1850-1900  (Albuquerque:  
University of New Mexico Press, 1993).  See also:  De Leon and Stewart, 
Tejanos and the Numbers Game:  A Socio-Historical Interpretation from the 
Federal Censuses, 1850-1900 (Albuquerque:  University of New Mexico Press, 
1989).  
13 Arnoldo De Leon, The Tejano Community, 1836-1900  (Albuquerque:  
University of New Mexico Press, 1982). See chapters on “Politics and Tejanos,” 
“The Rural Scene” and “Ordinary People.”  
  15 
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Carolina Press, 1948, 2002) and Ralph Wooster, Texas and Texans in the Civil 
War (Austin:  Eakin Press, 1995).  
16 James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil 
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 104. 
17 For references on soldiers and motivation in the American Civil War, see 
McPherson, For Cause and Comrades. See also Gerald Linderman, Embattled 
Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York: Free 
Press, 1987). 
18 Thompson, Vaqueros, 7.  
19  Emilio Zamora, et al., eds., Mexican Americans in Texas History (Austin: 
Texas State Historical Association, 1999). 
20 John Denny Riley, “Santos Benavides:  His Influence on the Lower Rio 
Grande, 1823-1891”  (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1976), 4. 
21 Ibid., 109.  
22 Roberto Ramon Calderon, “Mexican Politics in the American Era, 1846-1900:  
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23  Hinojosa, A Borderlands Town in Transition:  Laredo, 1755-1870, 84-85.  The 
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action by those in a system of oppression or restriction by a different race or 
class. Chief amongst these historians is Eugene D. Genovese. In Roll, Jordan, 
Roll: The World The Slaves Made (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974; New 
York: Vintage Books, 1976), Genovese contends that “Slaves had achieved a 
degree of psychological and cultural autonomy and therefore had successfully 
resisted becoming extensions of their masters’ wills” (148). As such, Tejanos 
carved out their niche in a system where they were subjected to the whims of 
their Anglo neighbors. Their support for the Confederacy should be taken to 
mean that they made a conscious decision to try and escape the status quo that 
had been forced upon them since Texas was annexed to the United States. 
Tejanos became more than just a subjugated class by becoming more like their 
Anglo neighbors.  See also E. P. Thompson, Making of the English Working 
Class (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963). Thompson looks at class awareness 
and the ability of lower classes to see that they are aware of their surroundings 
and are not simply instruments of the upper propertied classes.  
24 For works on Tejano political culture, please see works cited by De Leon, 
Riley, Hinojosa and Calderon in note 8.  
25 Thompson, Vaqueros, 7. 
26   See correspondence between John Ford and Santos Benavides in the John 
S. Ford Papers at the Texas State Archives and the John Z. Leyendecker 
Papers at the University of Texas Center for American History, Austin.  
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CHAPTER II 
TEJANO AND ANGLO SETTLEMENT: CONFLICT AND 
COLLABORATION ALONG THE RIO GRANDE, 1836-1865 
 
 Beginning in the 1820’s, Americans traveling west and seeking new lands 
to farm and settle encountered the farthest outposts of Spanish settlement in 
Texas.  Following Mexico’s independence from Spain, the Mexican government 
began to encourage settlement of Texas, in order to stimulate economic growth 
of the border region, and to encourage political cooperation between Americans 
and Mexicans.1  When the descendant cultures of Spain and England met in 
Texas, conflict inevitably ensued. The two parent nations had been enemies for 
centuries.  Although Mexico and the United States both revolted to rid 
themselves of the rule of their colonial parents, prejudices and perceptions that 
these two cultures brought with them into Texas contributed to conflict between 
Tejanos and American Anglo settlers.   
Both Tejano and Anglo settlers in Texas made concerted efforts to 
reconcile their differences.  While the antebellum and Civil War alliance between 
Tejanos and Anglos was often tenuous at best, it did allow for a unique example 
of the steps undertaken by two different peoples to bridge the gap between their 
cultures and nations.  Although the end results may have been disappointing to 
both Anglos and Tejanos, the brief alliance showed that, under certain 
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circumstances, Tejanos could form an important part of Texan, and American, 
life.  
 When Anglo settlers began arriving in Texas during the 1820’s, they 
found the frontier between the United States and Mexico devoid of any kind of 
governmental control.  Therefore, the new Anglo settlers rarely had to 
accommodate to Mexican life.  Rather, they retained their Anglo-American 
identity as English speaking Protestants.  Despite strong efforts by the Mexican 
government to absorb Anglo settlers into Mexico’s culture, such as making 
Spanish the official language of Texas, making the settlers Mexican citizens, and 
requiring Texans to convert to Roman Catholicism, Anglos retained their identity 
as Americans.2   Since many of the American settlers came from the southern 
portion of the United States, the Mexican ban on slavery was a concern to those 
Mexican authorities that administered the American colonization of Texas.  
Stephen F. Austin, like his father Moses Austin, sought to obtain rights for 
Americans to colonize the northern territories held by first Spain then Mexico 
following their war for independence.  When negotiating settlement rights in 
1823, Stephen Austin ensured that African slaves could be brought into Texas.3 
A major part of the settlement rights was the Mexican Constitution of 
1824, in which the Federalist government of Mexico allowed for provincial 
freedom, and gave some autonomy to the local governments, rather than have 
power vested exclusively in the central government in Mexico City.  The roots of 
the Texas Revolution lay in the repudiation of this constitution by Mexican 
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President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna in 1835.4   Historian Andres Resendez 
argues that regardless of the victor of the Federalist-Centeralist conflict, Texan 
slaveowners came to the realization that neither side would be committed to the 
preservation of slavery in Texas.5 
 Directly following the Texas Revolution in 1838, Tejanos found 
themselves in a difficult situation.  They could either leave Texas as Mexicans or 
create a new Texan and American identity for themselves.  Since the Texans 
had been successful in their bid for independence from Mexico, this ushered in a 
new government, and despite some Tejano support for the Texas separatists, 
especially from those who lived in Bexar County, negative Anglo perceptions still 
prevailed.6  The Texas Revolution had been brutal for both Anglos and Tejanos, 
but many Tejanos found themselves victimized by both sides, regardless of their 
affiliation. Anglos distrusted Tejanos, and suspected them of continued 
allegiance to Mexico.  Mexican authorities considered all settlers in Texas who 
did not show outright support for Santa Anna and the Centralists in Mexico to be 
in league with the rebellious Texans.  Many Tejanos, most notably Juan Seguin, 
supported the move for Texas independence, and served in several 
engagements, including San Jacinto.7  Andres Resendez has a unique theory 
as to why these men sided as they did. According to him, Tejanos, while having
a deep personal commitment to the state of Mexico, made the choices 
necessary for survival.
 
 
8  Furthermore, Resendez asserts that the people of 
Texas had considerable room in which to maneuver politically. He contends that
  
  21   
all people in Texas had choices and exercised their ability to make them in a 
very confined political arena.9  These two assertions, taken together can be 
used to prove that, although their choices were limited, Tejanos did have a 
choice in deciding their loyalties. As important as this was during the Texas 
Revolution, Tejanos again exercised their choice by siding with the Confederacy 
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in 1860-1861.  
 Juan Seguin, descendant of Mexican elites who helped settle Texas, wa
one of many Tejanos to serve during the Texas Revolution.10 Seguin’s father, 
Erasmo Seguin, had aided Moses and Stephen Austin in their efforts to bring
Anglo settlers from the United States in an effort to help modernize northern 
Mexico.11 Seguin came to prominence during the Texas War for Independen
against Mexico as the captain of a small company of mounted volunteers.12 
Seguin was even present at the Alamo, but escaped as a messenger to warn 
Colonel James Fannin of Santa Anna’s advance into Bexar and San Anto
Seguin and his men were well renowned for their hatred of Santa Anna.  
Houston initially sought to protect them from their bloodthirsty compatriots durin
the battle of San Jacinto.  Seguin protested this and was eventually allowed
join the attack on Santa Anna’s position.14  Houston wrote Seguin in 1837 
assuring him of the high esteem in which he was held by his President.15  Afte
San Jacinto, Seguin was cited for his bravery by Sam Houston, and it is clear 
some social interaction occurred between the two veterans in the years followin
the war.16 The actions of Juan Seguin during the Texas war for independence
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coupled with those of the men who fought in the Federalist-Centralist wars in 
Mexico, served to establish the basis for Texan nationalism for some Tejanos, 
as these men were indeed fighting against their former countrymen. Likewise
the Texas Revolution and the Federalist-Centralist wars created a distinctly 
Tejano revolutionary tradi
, 
tion that may have inspired those men who served in 
the Am
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ewise, 
with 
as none 
onel Juan Seguin, one of the major heroes of the Texas 
Revolu
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erican Civil War.  
A large number of non-combatants decided to flee contested areas durin
the Revolution.  Those who supported the Revolution and doubted its success
followed the Texan Army on its flight towards American Louisiana.  Lik
Tejanos who supported Santa Anna or simply did not wish to engage 
themselves in the conflict fled towards Mexico.  This movement did not stop 
the surrender of Santa Anna after San Jacinto.  Many Tejanos fled towards 
Mexico after Santa Anna’s surrender to escape the hands of Anglos seeking 
revenge on Mexican civilians for the recent war.  Among those exiles w
other than Col
tion.17 
Those that stayed in the new Texas Republic found themselves the 
targets of vengeful Anglos who did not wish to share their nation with Tejanos.  
Despite official orders to the contrary, Tejanos had their property seized and had 
to leave towns now controlled by Anglo settlers.  Many Tejanos were forced from
their homes by recent arrivals from the United States, and the situation was no
helped by the indifference of Texan commanders such as Thomas J. Rusk
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None other than Sam Houston, commander of the Texas Army during the 
Revolution, urged the soldiers of the Texas Republic to treat Tejano settlers
“all moderation and humanity that is possible.”
 with 
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19  It is worth noting that the 
orders to the Texan Army for dealing with Tejano settlers were made out no
English, but in Spanish.  Whether the order was meant to be distributed to 
Tejano soldiers or whether it was meant to reassure Tejano settlers is uncertai
Judging from the general behavior of the Texan army, it is likely that Houston
intended the order to be read or distributed to the local inhabitants of areas
through which the army was moving.  Houston seemed to imply that good 
treatment of Tejano settlers was a point of honor to the Texas Army.  But the 
fact that Sam Houston demonstrated concerns of how Tejanos would be treated
by his men is especially telling of the adversarial relationship between Tejanos 
and the new Texas Republic.  That Houston needed to involve the sensibilities 
of the men as sold
ns were.20 
Sam Houston was certainly a controversial figure to many of his 
contemporaries for his friendship with what many Anglos considered were
undesirable portions of society, such as Indians and rowdy whites.21 This 
reputation was probably not enhanced by Houston’s familiarity with some of the
more prominent Tejanos of the early Texas Republic. As hostilities once ag
rose with Mexico in 1844, Houston wrote President Santa Anna of Mexico 
asking for the release of Jose Antonio Navarro, then a prisoner of Mexico
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the abortive Santa Fe Expedition.22 Houston appeared to be close to the 
Navarro family, as when word reached him of the plight of Jose Antoni
Houston visited Navarro’s family near Segu
o Navarro, 
in, Texas, in order to give 
assura
o 
 
active 5 
 Texas 
 
 banner in Texas.  One of them served under Santos Benavides 
 of 
nces of aid to secure his release.23 
While not mentioning the Tejano question overtly in his writings, Sam 
Houston was still open in his dealings and affections for Tejanos. Among these 
were Juan Seguin and his wife, Gertrudis Flores Seguin, with whom he hoped t
make a social call sometime in 1842.24 This connection with the Seguins does
not necessarily translate into Anglo acceptance of Tejanos as a whole, but it 
does show that high-ranking Anglo officials, like Sam Houston, were socially 
with influential Tejanos in the community, such as the Seguin family. 2
Jose Antonio Navarro was another influential figure in the movement 
towards both Americanization and Tejano support of the Confederacy. Prior to 
the Texas Revolution, Navarro had been a mid-level Mexican politician, who lent 
his voice to Stephen Austin’s call for slavery in Texas. At the onset of the
Revolution, Navarro, whose family lived in Bexar County, served on the 
constitutional committee to formulate the creation of a Texas Republic. Navarro
stayed active in Texas politics and his family sent several sons to serve under 
the Confederate
as a captain.26 
 Tejanos living north of the Nueces Strip became more accommodating
Anglos following Texas independence from Mexico.  During the period from 
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1836 to 1845 most border contact between Anglo Texans and Tejanos was 
limited to this area north of the Nueces River, as the boundary between Mexico 
and Texas had not been solidified.  Following Santa Anna’s defeat, the Mexican
government did not recognize the creation of the Texas Republic and asserted
that if it did exist, the border was located at the Nueces River in South Texas 
(see figure 1).
 
 
e 
cult 
U.S-Mexican War, with vigilante 
roups running Tejanos off of their land.30 
 
27  Texas, however, considered the Rio Grande the dividing line 
between Texas and Mexico.   Therefore, people in the Rio Grande valley, wher
few Anglos had settled during early colonization, became isolated from Anglo 
encroachment.28  The Rio Grande valley became a staging area for frequent 
military incursions into Texas by Mexicans eager to reclaim it as part of their 
nation.29  These forays into central Texas made life considerably more diffi
for Tejanos seeking to accommodate to Anglo control.  Incidents of ethnic 
violence spread in the years leading to the 
g
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Figure 1: Johnson’s New Map of the State of Texas, 1864. 
 
 By 1847 Texas had become a state in the American Union. In November 
of that year, John B. Hayes, a Texas Ranger, captured Laredo and Mirabeau B. 
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Lamar, then governor of Texas, annexed it as part of the United States.31  With 
the border pushing further south, into areas more densely populated by Tejanos, 
Anglos encountered more resistance to Americanization.  In Laredo, instances 
of Tejano/Anglo violence rarely occurred, and Anglos in an area 
demographically dominated by Tejanos began to acculturate and accommodate 
to Tejano ways of life.  In this area, it was important that Tejano landowning 
families intermarried with Anglo elites to solidify their political hold on South 
Texas and to ensure that they retained possession of their land.32  Many Tejano 
families in South Texas maintained their political dominance of the region.  One 
of the best examples of this was the Benavides family of Laredo.  
The Benavides family had longstanding ties to the northern bank of the 
Rio Grande and had a revolutionary tradition well in place before Santos 
Benavides sided with the Confederacy. This family was descended from Tomas 
Sanchez, one of the original founders of the town of Laredo.33  The patriarch of 
the family in the years before the Civil War was Bacilio Benavides, uncle to 
Santos and a prominent merchant and political leader along the Rio Grande. 
Basilio Benavides was involved in the abortive attempt to separate northern 
Mexico from the control of its national government in the late 1830’s and was 
deeply involved in the Centralist-Federalist war as a guerrilla for the Federalist 
cause.34 
Following the annexation of Texas and the Southwest, incidents of 
violence occurred along the border as Anglos came to dominate political life.  
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The most notorious of these incidents was the Cortina War of 1859. Juan N. 
Cortina was the son of wealthy landholding elites in Brownsville who was 
angered by the blatant land seizures by Anglo Texans.35  The Cortina War 
began when Juan Cortina attacked a city marshal in Brownsville, Texas while 
the marshal was attempting to arrest a drunken Tejano.36  Following this 
incident, Cortina founded a bandit group that attacked American Anglos and 
wealthy Tejanos from south of the river.  Sam Houston, then governor of Texas, 
asked that the people of Mexico, and by extension, Tejanos, not be blamed for 
the actions of a few rogues. Rather, Houston concluded that “Mexicans are a 
mild, pastoral and gentle people” and that “demagogues and lawless chieftains” 
were those responsible for outrages against Texas.37   
According to historian Arnoldo De Leon, Cortina’s acts of violence could 
be interpreted in different ways.  Although some historians hold that Cortina 
sought to avenge the Tejano loss of power in south Texas, others argue that he 
acted out only in the spirit of banditry.38 These perceptions of Cortina’s 
intentions were also present at the time. Many Anglos saw Cortina as a brigand, 
but many Tejanos saw his actions as someone who was standing up for their 
traditional rights and as one who stood firm against blatant Anglo land seizures.  
Cortina himself wrote that he sought vengeance for the outrages committed 
upon Tejanos.  “Many of you have been robbed of your property, incarcerated, 
chased, murdered and hunted like wild beasts,” wrote Cortina in one of his 
“Pronunciamientos,” or proclamations that he wrote trying to inflame Tejano 
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sentiment against Anglos in Texas.39  Cortina took such provocative steps as 
engaging Anglo forces and flying a Mexican flag in Texas to show that some 
loyalty to the old country still existed.40 In essence, Cortina’s approach toward 
rebellion to Anglo hegemony in South Texas allowed for further discussion of 
identity. It showed that violence constituted a necessary or reasonable 
alternative to powerlessness in the eyes of some Tejanos.  Ethnic violence 
continued  along the border for many years, but the American Civil War shifted 
the forms of violence from ethnic lines to the greater conflict between Yankee 
and Confederate, and between soldiers and outlaws from both sides of the 
border.  
At this point, it is important to note that while negative perceptions of 
Tejanos still abounded, these perceptions were not shared by all of those in 
political power. Even as Cortina’s actions inflamed ethnic tensions between 
Anglos and Tejanos along the Rio Grande, Governor Sam Houston sent 
commissioners to seek out the causes of the Cortina conflict. Among those he 
sent was Angel Navarro III, a son of Jose Antonio Navarro.41  Jose Antonio 
Navarro even sent along a letter assuring Cortina that Anglo outrages committed 
along the Rio Grande were the acts of individuals, and not representative of 
Americans as a whole.42  The Cortina episode concluded when Houston sent a 
force of Texas Rangers and U.S. Army Regulars to chase Cortina from his 
strongholds near Brownsville with the help of Mexican Army Regulars from the 
border town of Matamoros, Mexico.43 For their part, the Rangers sent to capture 
  
  30   
Cortina and chase away these outlaws did little to change the view Cortina and 
other Tejanos had of them. Upon their arrival in Brownsville, William G. Tobin, 
commander of the Ranger contingent, incited mob violence.  In a public square, 
Tobin lynched one of Cortina’s lieutenants who was being held in the 
Brownsville jail, in a public square.44  Perhaps if Cortina had not used his brief 
occupation of Brownsville to settle personal scores the incident would not be 
perceived so negatively.45 
The prominent Benavides family of Laredo stood ready to accommodate 
to the new order in Texas.  Prior to the American annexation of Texas, members 
of the Benavides family were already landholding elites and wealthy merchants 
in south Texas.  Influential Tejano political leaders such as Jose Antonio 
Navarro, a political leader in the Texas Revolution, also took part in urging state 
unity, while looking to transcend ethnic lines.46  Although Navarro fought for the 
cause of Tejano rights he, along with Basilio Benavides, also championed the 
drive towards secession.47  Both men sent members of their families to war, and 
had enough influence throughout the state of Texas to allow their kinsmen to 
become officers for the Confederacy.   
Without considering the roots of the Tejano alliance with the Anglos, it 
may seem odd that Tejanos joined with the slaveholders of the South.  Tejano 
attitudes toward slavery varied substantially.  Some Tejanos sided against it and 
aided in the escape of African slaves across the Rio Grande.  This led to some 
local ordinances being passed by city councils and local government officials to 
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prevent the fraternization of Tejanos and slaves in towns, such as the one 
passed by the town of Seguin in 1854.48  But many Tejanos favored the 
continuation of slavery in Texas as a means of stimulating the economy and to 
accommodate southern whites into Texas.  For example, Jose Antonio Navarro 
supported slavery and ideas of white supremacy.49  In his journey through 
Texas, Frederick Law Olmsted observed the sometimes severe ways that some 
Tejanos treated their slaves, while at the same time others socialized with 
them.50  Olmsted also saw that Anglos treated Tejanos with contempt and 
suspicion because they saw them as a risk and competition to slave labor.51 
As conflicts over slavery continued, Anglo Democrats in Texas faced their 
first real threat to political power in the state with the creation of the nativist 
Know-Nothing Party.52  The organizers for the Know-Nothings sought to exclude 
Tejanos and other ethnic groups from American society.  In response to this 
threat to their traditional way of life, Tejano, Germans and Czech immigrants 
began joining the Democratic Party to aid in defeating the Know-Nothing Party.  
The alliance between the Democrats and Germans was short lasting, since 
Germans vehemently opposed the pro-slavery platform being pushed by the 
southern branch of the Democratic Party heading into the election of 1860.  
Some Tejanos had no problem with the Democrats being pro-slavery.  As a part 
of their accommodation into Texan, American, and southern society, Tejanos 
had a decision to make regarding their loyalties.  Germans could afford to 
oppose the traditional southern views on slavery.  Tejanos, most of whom still 
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occupied a very low level in Texan society, could not.  For this reason, and to 
stake their claim in the new southern order, Tejanos such as Basilio Benavides, 
Jose Antonio Navarro and their families, pledged allegiance to the Democratic 
Party and to the Confederacy. 53 
The various implications of Mexican American political alliances prior to 
the Civil War are open to interpretation. Modern historians have begun to 
examine the complex political culture of the antebellum Tejanos. Several issues 
separated Tejanos from their Anglo neighbors.  Politically and racially, Tejanos 
were still considered second class citizens. As seen with the Cortina affair, many 
Tejanos remained angry at Anglo encroachment or Anglo dominance over 
Texas society.  Culturally, Tejanos had also been forced in many parts of the 
state to give up traditional rights to open land and been forced to discontinue 
traditional celebrations.  Nevertheless, after years of violent clashes between 
Anglos and Tejanos, many Tejanos were willing to go along with such a radical 
act as secession. The Tejanos saw the Confederacy for what it was:  a new 
beginning in which they could try from the start to stake out their own place in 
society and accommodate the Anglos with whom they had so much tension in 
the early American period.  
It is unfortunate that Tejano soldiers and supporters of the Confederacy 
left so few records to establish their motivations and reasons for fighting, but the 
fact remains that they joined in notable numbers and did fight. The Tejano 
population had little problem with slavery, but they also had no great love for the 
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institution. Therefore, it would be a mistake to accuse them for fighting for 
slavery. Even in Laredo, where the patronage system would be its strongest in 
regards to the men of the Benavides Cavalry Regiment, it is still improbable that 
patronage was the sole factor motivating men to join the Confederate Army. 
When taken in a large context, patronage is difficult to argue here since the unit 
was recruited from such a large geographical area.54 Home has always been a 
strong impetus for enlistment, and here it was no different. The estimated 2,500 
Tejanos who served for the Confederacy and alongside such Tejano leaders as 
Santos Benavides saw themselves for what they were:  Texans. While some 
958 of their Tejano neighbors fought for the Union, they doubtless must have 
believed that they fought for the right side.55 In the end, it is important to 
remember that each man joined for his own reasons.  
In the provocative book, Boundaries, historian Peter Sahlins  explains that 
national identity “is the expression of cultural unity and national consciousness 
consolidated within the political framework of a centralized state.”56  It is evident 
that Tejanos such as Benavides had decided upon a definite national identity. 
Some Tejanos in Texas began to see themselves as Americans during the latter 
antebellum period and the Civil War. It is during the Know-Nothing popularity in 
Texas that many Tejanos become politically active as they saw that they may 
become marginalized in American society. What kind of Americans they would 
be was the only question left to be decided. During the Civil War, the issue at 
hand was how America would be defined. For the Confederacy, national identity 
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involved, among other things, a slave based economy in which control was 
vested in the local and state government. Following the Civil War, a national 
identity for the United States had been established by the victorious northern 
forces, both military and political. This identity involved greater central 
governmental political control, but also allowed for more ethnic diversity. In 
Texas, pressures of war forced Tejanos to try and solidify themselves culturally 
and politically within Texas and the Confederacy. Given their relative geographic 
isolation from the rest of America, Tejanos and Anglo Texas identified 
themselves more with the local authorities rather than the national power. 
Traditional federalist values, which were held over from the time of the 1824 
Mexican Constitution, such as regional autonomy, were reflected in the 
Confederate cause, and this led to many Tejanos, including the men of the 
Benavides family, to identify with the Confederacy. 57 
If Sahlins is correct in contending that national identity is created from the 
center outwards and inwards, then Texas may well be an excellent example of 
this contention.58 Any influence that Laredo or San Antonio may have had on 
Washington or Richmond was negligible, but these national capitals did have an 
influence, for a short time, on what the definition of “Texan” would be. The 
national identities that were being argued over in the East also needed 
resolution in the West. Therefore, Tejanos such as Navarro and Benavides, as 
well as myriad others among the common people invested themselves, their 
effort, and their lives to becoming politically more like their Anglo neighbors.59 
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During the Civil War, Tejanos attempted to show themselves capable of 
Americanism and to show that they had detached themselves from Mexico, if not 
completely culturally, then at least politically.  
Sahlins claims that the process of crafting a national identity for people in 
the region between France and Spain took several centuries. If one would look 
at the Tejano experience in Texas during the Civil War, it is possible to see that 
same behavior exhibited in the Cerdanya in the centuries after the initial 
remapping of the political boundary. Sahlins asserts that Cerdans used the 
national identities of France and Spain to their own benefits.60  The same is true 
of Tejanos during the early American period in Texas from 1848-1865, choosing 
to be Mexican, Texan, American or Confederate as it suited them. Sahlins’ 
argument that Cerdans defined themselves in regards to the defense of their 
social and territorial boundaries can be applied in Texas during the antebellum 
period. Tejanos formulated an alliance of convenience with the Southern 
Democratic Party when it became apparent that their social boundaries were 
being challenged. To the Tejanos, the violation of their traditional property rights 
by Anglos was met by some with violence, as was the case with Cortina. To 
others, such as the families of  Benavides and Navarro, the Anglo encroachment 
prompted greater degrees of cooperation between the two peoples to prevent 
further loss of rights.  
Sahlins asserts that national identity has nothing to do with so-called 
natural geographical boundaries.61 Rather, it is socially constructed over many 
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62years and involves a “continuous process of defining ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’.”  
Even though the Rio Grande provided a clear natural boundary, it did not do 
much to sever the ties of the old and new country. That the border was porous 
enough to allow invasions of Northern Mexico by Benavides during the Civil War 
with little effort and little to be done by Governor Albino Lopez of the Mexican 
State of Tamaulipas speaks to the very fluid nature of the national boundaries. 
From 1838 through 1865, as a new shifting national identity was being crafted by 
the Tejanos themselves, the distinction between those who sought to identify 
politically and nationally with the United States those that sought to identify with 
Mexico were very clear. 63 
To those Tejanos who served with the Union or with the Confederacy, the 
process of deciding who was friend and foe was ongoing. This is best evidenced 
by the Vidal Affair, in which Adrian J. Vidal, a Mexican born Confederate officer 
and stepson to the wealthy landholder Mifflin Kenedy, defected to Union service 
and then deserted into Mexico with a large contingent of his men.64  To men 
such as Juan Cortina, any Anglo who stood against him was an outsider and an 
enemy, yet to men such as Benavides, Anglos could be considered among his 
allies. Following the war, the definitions changed yet again, as Benavides 
became more involved with the American identity by being elected to hold state 
office. Sahlins argues that as the Cerdanya region managed to maintain some 
local identity, it became increasingly French. The Rio Grande border region was 
much the same. It is doubtful that many Tejanos were as worried by the Civil 
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War in the East as they were by the French intervention into Mexico, which 
lasted from 1864 until 1867. The debate over national identity continues into the 
twenty-first century. Many believe that to be American one must be English 
speaking. Many of the people that live along the Rio Grande, both Anglo and 
Tejano, are bilingual. Yet most living along the northern banks of the river would 
consider themselves American, and those who live along the southern banks 
consider themselves Mexican. After Texan independence, the Rio Grande was 
only the boundary between two nations, but it came to symbolize a national 
boundary by which people identified themselves. This chapter has examined 
aspects of the first few years of this process along the Rio Grande, but Sahlins’ 
work provides context and comparison for the understanding of American, 
Confederate and Mexican national identities.65 
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CHAPTER III 
NUESTRA GUERRA: TEJANOS AND CONFEDERATE MILITARY 
SERVICE IN THE CIVIL WAR 
 
 The Civil War was a turning point for race relations in the United States.  
While the most important advances were made in relations to Anglos and 
African Americans, Mexican Americans also made advances during this period. 
One avenue in which different ethnicities, such as African, Mexican and Irish 
Americans made advancements into American society was in military service. 
This chapter will discuss the military career of Santos Benavides and the men of 
the Benavides Partisan Cavalry Regiment and draw conclusions from their 
service in regards to the ongoing process of Americanization.    
 While Mexican Americans have received mention in Civil War 
historiography, the process of Americanization has been largely ignored.  
Remarkably, one of the first writers to acknowledge Mexican Americans, albeit 
superficially, in his work was Marcus J. Wright, a brigadier general in the 
Confederate army.  In his book, Texas In The War: 1861-1865, Wright discussed 
the wartime career of the Santos Benavides Partisan Cavalry Company and 
Regiment.1  The reference is made in passing and list no recognition of the role 
played by the Benavides Partisan Cavalry Regiment in consolidating 
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Confederate war goals along the Rio Grande, nor does it discuss any of the 
engagements in which the unit participated   
Recent historiography of Mexican American participation in the war has 
focused more on the military contributions.  In 1977, Jerry Don Thompson 
focused his book Vaqueros Blue and Gray on the war along the Rio Grande, but 
still not discussing the wider implications for race relations and for 
Americanization.2  Thompson followed this work with another which focused 
solely on the contributions of Mexican Americans who served in the Union army, 
but this work is largely a restatement of some of the conclusions and work 
previously stated in Vaqueros.3  Even with the sometimes superficial nature in 
which Thompson discusses the implications of Tejano military service in the Civil 
War, these are still the two most important and comprehensive works dealing 
with Mexican American involvement in the Civil War.  Since the publication of 
these books, several others have been published that look at the war in Texas, 
but also take only passing interest in the contributions of Mexican Americans.  
Ralph A. Wooster, in his work on Texas Confederate units, only briefly examines 
the Mexican Americans who were a part of Benavides’ regiment.4  Alvin M. 
Josephy, Jr. likewise discusses the plight of Mexican American troops, but 
focuses only on the contempt with which they are treated by Anglo officers and 
other troops.5  Undoubtedly, the high illiteracy rate amongst Tejano troops has 
made research difficult.6  Many of the Tejano units had illiteracy rates going as 
high as 100 percent, with only the officers able to write and read.7 For this 
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reason, resources such as the correspondence between Colonel Santos 
Benavides and Colonel John Ford are invaluable in the study of the contributions 
of Mexican Americans to the Confederate war effort in Texas during the 
American Civil War.   
 Following the Texas referendum on secession, Texas seceded from the 
Union on February 23, 1861.  On April 17, 1861, Santos Benavides, a 
shopkeeper and former mayor of Laredo, received a letter from Colonel John 
Ford, commander of the Rio Grande military district and former Texas Ranger, 
notifying him of his commission as a Captain of Partisan Rangers for the state of 
Texas.  Colonel Ford told Captain Benavides, “If the civil authorities of Zapata or 
any other county call on you for aid in executing the law or suppressing 
insurrection or riotous assemblages, it is your duty to render all the assistance in 
your power.”8  Benavides proved to be the most important Mexican American to 
serve with either side during the war.  He is also one of the most influential in 
regards of the formation of a Mexican American identity.   
 Santos Benavides was born in Laredo on November 1, 1823.  As a young 
man during Mexico’s Federalist-Centralist wars of the 1830’s and 1840’s, 
Benavides fought for the Federalist forces in south Texas. During the 1850’s, 
Benavides had been employed in chasing down fugitive slaves after Texas was 
annexed by the United States.9 Benavides was elected mayor of Laredo in 
1856, a position that his brother, Refugio held twice.  These men were 
descendants of Tomas Sanchez, the founder of Laredo in 1755.10  Being from 
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that part of Texas, Benavides was a popular man who exercised political and 
economic influence on the area before the war.  As such, he was familiar with 
many of the influential men on both sides of the river.  
When Benavides was commissioned as an officer, he also obtained 
commissions for his two brothers, Refugio and Cristobal.  Late in the war, 
Benavides granted a commission to his brother-in-law, John Z. Leyendecker, as 
assistant quartermaster of his regiment.11  As historian Walter Buenger asserts, 
Tejanos mirrored the commitment of Anglos to the land of their birth.12  
Benavides belong to an elite family in South Texas that had made efforts 
towards accommodation and adaptation to the Anglo presence along the Rio 
Grande.  As such, Benavides showed his loyalty to his home state much as 
others did, by enlisting to serve.  Early in their career as officers for the state of 
Texas they encountered the man that would prove to be a difficult and pervasive 
adversary to them well into the war, the Mexican bandit Juan Nepomuceno 
Cortina.  
 Hardly a month had passed since Benavides had received his 
commission when on May 19, Cortina crossed the Rio Grande, launching a raid 
on south Texas. While Benavides had received notice from Ford that war had 
begun between “the Confederate States and Mr. Lincoln’s government” on April 
19, 1861, it probably came as no surprise that Cortina, rather than a unit of 
Yankees, should be the first enemy in this war.13  Upon getting word of Cortina’s 
incursion into Texas, Benavides deployed his men to meet Cortina at the ranch 
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of a Mr. Redmond outside of Carrizo, Texas. In a letter reporting the incident to 
Col. Ford, Benavides claimed to have had 27 men at his command when making 
his stand against Cortina at the Redmond ranch, and he was opposed by a 
“considerable force.”14  While it is only speculation as to the number of men 
Cortina had with him on this raid, the number may safely be estimated at or 
around 30, with some local outlaws joining in as Cortina rode by.15  
Benavides’ troopers met with an advance party of Cortina’s force but fell 
back because they were outnumbered.  Cortina had positioned his men so as to 
surround Benavides and prevent his escape. What the outlaw did not count on 
was the dispatch Benavides had sent to Lieutenant Callahan, who was stationed 
at Fort McIntosh some 65 miles away.  Callahan, arriving with reinforcements 
including Refugio Benavides, added another 36 men to aid Benavides in his fight 
with Cortina.  Benavides set out to meet Cortina and the approximately 70 men 
he had with him.  According to Benavides, Cortina’s men were “completely 
dispersed,” with Benavides’ men killing seven bandits outright and wounding 
many more.16  Evidently, Benavides ordered to his men not to take any 
prisoners.  Since his men had succeeded in taking eleven prisoners, it must be 
assumed that Benavides ordered these men summarily executed.17  
 After the battle at Carrizo, Ford wrote Benavides congratulating him on 
turning back Cortina.  Colonel Ford had himself had some experience in dealing 
with Cortina.  John Ford had become a Texas Ranger after a term in the Texas 
legislature.  In 1859, Cortina and Colonel Ford had clashed several times, with 
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Ford fighting in conjunction with U.S. Regular Army troops before the war.  In 
fact, historian Lyman L. Woodman argues that the battles against Cortina were a 
type of “training prologue which benefited a number of officers who were to 
serve in gray and blue between 1861 and 1865.”18  On May 27, 1861, Ford 
praised Benavides for his actions against his old foe.  Benavides’ “highly 
satisfactory” effort against Cortina merited recognition for “judgment, ability and 
gallantry.”19 
In this same letter, Ford recognized an issue had cropped up that plagued 
Benavides and the Confederacy as a whole: the problem of supply.  Benavides 
had been ill equipped going into his first fight against Cortina.  Ford wanted to 
make sure this would not happen again.  Ford told Benavides that 
“arrangements have been made to arm the regiment with Colt’s pistols.”20  It is 
most likely that the men that rode with Benavides against Cortina at Carrizo 
were armed with an assortment of weapons.  Whether or not they were out 
classed in weaponry by Cortina and his men is a source of speculation. 
However, it is clear that the command structure in Texas wanted Benavides and 
his men to be outfitted with the best equipment available to them, thus the 
request for Colt revolvers.  
 Of all the logistical difficulties faced by the Confederacy, supply was 
arguably the worst.  And while this supply issue was worst in the East, the 
Confederate troops fighting in the West were no exception.  Although Texas was 
not the site of major battles, such as the states in the East, it still found itself low 
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on provisions necessary to field effective armies.  In the letter acknowledging his 
commission, Colonel Ford tells Captain Benavides that he “will endeavor to 
procure the bugle required” of a volunteer company.  While this was certainly not 
a major problem in supply, and a bugle may not have been one of the war 
materials most desperately needed by the new company, there were other short 
comings that highlighted the supply problem in the Rio Grande.  After 
Benavides’ engagement against Cortina in late May, Ford seemed to have 
solved at least some of this problem.  On May 29, 1861, Ford issued a dispatch 
to Benavides telling him that a boat had been sent to Benavides with “fifty rifles 
and accoutrements,” apparently were “the only kind on hand.”21  On this same 
boat, Ford sent “rations of subsistence” and believed that “your command will be 
properly supplied.”22 
 In this letter, Ford also touched on another sensitive issue which was 
important not only to the Confederacy, but to the Mexicans and Mexican 
Americans who fought in the War.  The crossing of the Rio Grande frontier of 
Texas was an issue that bothered the commanders of the Confederacy and the 
men who fought for it throughout the war.  In 1863, with the backing of French 
Emperor Napoleon III, Emperor Maximilian had seized control of Mexico, 
deposing Mexican president Benito Juarez, who continued to lead a resistance 
movement against the occupying forces.  This intervention by France was a 
blatant violation of the Monroe Doctrine.  While this may not have been a major 
concern to the Confederacy, it opened the possibility of yet another hostile force 
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to contend with along the Rio Grande. The French intervention also meant that 
Union activity would intensify in Texas as a show of force to the occupation 
forces.  Eventually, the Imperialists and Nationalist forces would ally themselves 
with the Confederacy and the Union, respectively, but during the initial stages of 
the conflict, the reactions and intentions of the new regime in Mexico City were 
still unclear. 
 In the course of pursuing Cortina, Benavides sometimes found it 
necessary to follow Cortina across the river.  Violating the border line presented 
a problem to both his superior officer and to the government of Mexico.  This is 
not to say that there was no cooperation between Mexican and Confederate 
authorities.  On June 2, 1861, Ford wrote Benavides notifying him of the 
intention of General Guadalupe Garcia from Matamoros, Mexico, to cross the 
river and to “aid in putting down the partisans of Cortina and Ochoa” and to help 
in “giving peace and tranquility to the frontier.”23  Antonio Ochoa was another 
Mexican outlaw and sometime ally of Cortina, who had also been sought for 
inciting rebellion in Zapata County.24   
Cooperation, however, was not the norm.  In correspondence to General 
Hamilton P. Bee, Governor Albino Lopez complained that Benavides and his 
men, in crossing into Mexico, have trampled “on civil and military authorities.”25  
Adding to the outrage felt by Governor Lopez was the apparent abduction of 
former Texas judge and Federal Colonel Edmund J. Davis, who was at the time 
organizing troops of Texas Unionists and Mexicans willing to fight for the Union.  
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Lopez was apparently concerned that these attacks would “produce bitter 
feelings; the slightest motive may render fruitless all efforts of the chief 
authorities to settle existing differences,” and perhaps lead to further violence 
between Mexican bandits, Mexican troops and Confederate soldiers if Bee’s 
subordinates (including Benavides) “do not act with more prudence.”26   Lopez, 
in his correspondence to Bee, asserted Mexico’s neutrality and stated that he 
would not tolerate “acts which violate the neutrality of Mexico,” including Colonel 
Davis’ attempts to raise troops to fight against the Confederacy.27  
For his part, Bee disavowed the border crossing that seized Colonel 
Davis.28 But even then, Bee was unapologetic in doing so.  After all, Davis was 
an enemy, and it appeared, at least to Bee, and probably also to Ford and 
Benavides, that Governor Lopez was, if not completely supporting the actions 
taken by Davis, then at least allowing them to go on by his inaction.  On the topic 
of Davis’ release from custody of the Confederacy, Bee stated that “Were I to 
consider the many instances in which the dignity of my country has been 
outraged, and the lives and property of my fellow-citizens sacrificed, by persons 
operating under the advice and control of this same E. J. Davis, while harbored 
on the neutral soil of Mexico, I might perhaps be justly led to a different 
determination.”29  
Accordingly, Bee also praised Benavides in a letter to Lopez after Davis 
was returned to the south bank of the Rio Grande. Bee said that he held a “high 
appreciation” of Captain Benavides “as a man of prudence and discretion” and 
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that he was “satisfied that the authorities on both sides of the line may equally 
confide in him as not likely to do any act to compromise the relation which 
should exist.”30 Even as the relations between the Confederacy and Mexico 
remained tenuous and strained, Bee recognized the ability of his subordinate 
and, in effect, did nothing to stop Benavides from making any further raids into 
Mexican territory.  
It is important to note that not all Mexican Americans fought for the 
Confederacy.  Edmund J. Davis, a former Texas Judge and Union colonel, had 
fled to Mexico after secession and had begun enlisting men in the First Texas 
(Union) Cavalry Regiment, a unit that served in Texas and Louisiana.  In Mexico, 
Davis found an ally in Leonard Pierce, U.S. Consul to Mexico at Matamoros.  In 
his own right, Pierce raised many troops for the Union cause, mainly Germans 
from the Texas Hill country who had escaped lynching by secessionists and 
some old veterans from the regular army.31  While Davis’ 1st Texas (Union) 
Cavalry consisted of some Tejanos, John L. Haynes wanted to recruit Tejanos 
exclusively for his newly formed unit, the 2nd Texas (Union) Cavalry Regiment.  
Haynes was a Unionist, but openly opposed the election of Abraham Lincoln, 
calling him an “obnoxious man.”32  
Haynes began circulating handbills promising a bounty on signing up, 
clothing, another bounty at the end of the war and a salary of thirteen dollars a 
month for the duration of the war.33  Apparently, these offers prompted a large 
number of Mexican nationals and Tejanos who had not enlisted for service in 
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one of the Confederate units to enlist in Federal forces.  If there was a difference 
to the men who served with Benavides and the men who served with Haynes 
and Davis, it must have been purely ideological.  The men who served on either 
side seemed to come from similar backgrounds.  Perhaps these men were more 
like Juan Cortina who had previous grievances with the South and with Texas, 
and these grievances contributed to their choice in allegiance.  However, as had 
been the case since before even the Revolutionary War, men who were given 
bounties sometimes deserted their newly formed unit.  The problem seems 
appeared to be so bad in the 2nd Texas (Union) Cavalry that the commanders 
decided to make an example of one of the men for desertion.  This unfortunate 
man, Private Pedro Garcia, who was believed to have been a twenty-five-year-
old farmer, was executed on June 22, 1864.34  Historian Jerry Thompson argues 
that the reason for the mass amounts of desertion is due in large part to not 
receiving the clothing promised in the handbill these men saw before enlisting.35  
It seems, however that Private Garcia was not nearly the coward many thought 
he was.  According to Benjamin F. McIntyre, Garcia refused the bandage offered 
him to hide his eyes from the firing squad.36  Private Garcia showed the men 
who executed him something of the bravery he would have had, if the Union 
lived up to its end of the bargain. As infamous as Private Garcia’s case was, it 
was still just a basic case of desertion.  There is a more telling example of how a 
young idealist can be shifted away from a cause due in no small part to 
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institutional racism and the inability of both Union and Confederate governments 
to make good on their promises.   
Such was the story of Adrian J. Vidal.  Vidal was born in Mexico before 
the Mexican American War. He moved to Texas when his mother married a 
wealthy landowner in south Texas named Mifflin Kenedy.37  In October of 1862, 
Vidal enlisted as a private in a Confederate partisan company being formed in 
San Antonio.  Soon, due in no small part to the influence of his stepfather, Vidal 
became a lieutenant of a partisan company, under the command of Captain 
Richard Taylor.38  The conditions under which Vidal served were difficult.  His 
men often lacked shoes and clothing, and many of the items needed for camp, 
such as tents, pots and pans.39  At least at the beginning of his Confederate 
career, Vidal made the best of the situation, even capturing a Union gunboat in 
July, 1863.40  For unclear reasons, Vidal and his men chose to abandon the 
Confederacy, and fled to Mexico after his desertion and the murder of two of 
their former comrades.41  Some of these men were captured by Cortina, who 
was by then a Mexican military officer.42 
Cooperation between Mexico and the Confederacy prevailed during the 
mutiny of Vidal and his men.  Like General Garcia and Colonel Benavides, men 
from both sides of the river decided that perhaps the best course of action would 
be to hunt down these men for the crimes they committed while in Texas, and 
for any crimes they might commit in Mexico.  In a letter to Governor Manuel 
Ruiz, General Bee speculated that “one who would violate his allegiance, to 
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plunder his own people, would not be likely to be more lenient in a foreign 
country, and the cause of humanity and justice both appeal for prompt and 
united action.”43  In his reply, Ruiz assured Bee that “I at once gave orders that 
all the troops on the line should unite in pursuing the insurrectionists” and that 
“combined efforts” on behalf of Mexican and Confederate troops would provide 
the best results to concluding this affair.44 
Had this been the end of the Vidal affair, it would have been enough, but 
Vidal apparently was not done fighting the Civil War of his adopted country.  On 
November 26, 1863, Vidal volunteered for service with Union forces gathering in 
the newly occupied city of Brownsville, and agreed to raise a company of 
partisan rangers attached to Davis’ 1st Texas (Union) Cavalry.45  Vidal and his 
men served the Union army well into 1864, but the same problems arose for 
Vidal yet again.  Vidal, who was still a young man at the time, soon began to 
reject the authority that was being placed over him by the Union army.  To his 
credit, it seems Vidal remained loyal to his second army longer than many of the 
men whom he recruited. Prior to Vidal’s desertion, 53 men had already deserted, 
with more men leaving after their captain had left.46  Of the men who joined 
Vidal and served the Union army, only 23 served out the remainder of their 
time.47  Vidal met his end eventually at the hands of the imperialist troops of 
Maximilian after joining up with Benito Juarez and his revolutionaries.48  
Even as the Union had its trials and tribulations with the use of Mexican 
American troops, the Confederates still enjoyed the success of theirs.  While 
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Davis and Haynes organized their men into fighting units, Benavides continued 
his fight against outlaws and Union troops.  For Benavides, 1863 was an 
eventful, and highly successful, year.  Early in the year, the Texas State 
Legislature acknowledged Benavides along with his brother Refugio for “their 
vigilance, energy, and gallantry in pursuing and chastising the bandits infesting 
the Rio Grande frontier.”49  Shortly thereafter, Benavides was promoted to 
major.  As a major, Benavides proceeded to execute his war against outlaws on 
the Rio Grande.  In September of 1863, Benavides received an opportunity to 
finally crush a band of outlaws under Ocaviano Zapata, who had been receiving 
arms and support from the Union army at New Orleans.50  Benavides took 
command of the company of his brother Cristobal and crossed the Rio Grande, 
surprising the Zapatistas in a ravine and killing most of the leaders, including 
Zapata himself.51 Nearly two months later, Benavides was given permission by 
W. R. Briggs, chief of staff to Lieutenant General E. Kirby Smith, to “raise a 
regiment of partisan rangers in western Texas, from any men, whether within 
conscript age or not, not now in service, which regiment you will be appointed to 
command” due in large part to Benavides’ “gallant and distinguished services.”52 
In many ways, 1864 was the year that defined both Benavides and his 
regiment.  Supply troubles still prevailed along the Rio Grande, just as they did 
along the Rappahannock River in Virginia.  The only possible advantage the 
western Confederacy, especially Texans, had was the border with Mexico and 
the booming cotton trade through Matamoros which resulted from the Union 
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naval blockade on all southern ports. Even with the cotton trade, supplies were 
still hard to come by.  In a letter from Ford to Benavides in December of 1863, 
Ford began to order Benavides to hoard supplies.  Benavides was ordered by 
Ford to confiscate “a large quantity of flour at or near Laredo” and to “have it 
transported to some point near the Sol Del Rey and protected by a sufficient 
guard.”53  Ford told Benavides that capturing horses and mules should also 
become a priority, and that Benavides “should have an eye to them.”54  When 
Benavides replied on January 10, 1864, he acknowledged the orders, and 
informed Ford that he “has in Camargo 9,000 lbs of Flour, 500 lbs of rice, 160 
lbs of coffee and 2,500 lbs of powder” with beef “plentiful in the county” and 
adding “there will be no difficulty in getting them at a moments [sic] notice.”55  It 
appears that Benavides and his men had no trouble finding food.  However, as 
later correspondence shows, finding weapons and munitions was still a difficult 
enterprise in South Texas.  
In March of 1864, Benavides and his men received what would be their 
greatest challenge of the war.  On March 19, 1864, Benavides was attacked 
while camped at the border city of Laredo by 200 enemy cavalry composed of 
“Mexicans and Americans”, and expected 300 more enemy infantry and two 
pieces of artillery to face off against his force of only 60 men.56  According to 
one of Benavides’ men, the colonel blamed himself for being taken by surprise, 
since Benavides had been laid up sick in Laredo for several days.57  Nearly 
three years in the saddle were taking their toll on Benavides.  The day after the 
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battle, W. W. Camp wrote to Ford telling him that the Colonel was “seriously ill, 
owing to the fatigue and exposure he has undergone lately,” and that Bena
“cannot much longer stand the strain of it.”
vides 
58  The Union troops, part of Haynes’ 
2nd Cavalry, attacked Laredo for nearly three hours, but were turned back by 
Benavides’ men and their staunch defense of the city. 
Benavides again received acclaim from his Anglo superior officers for his 
actions.  As the eyes of the Confederate Army on the Rio Grande, Benavides 
and his men had witnessed various and increasing Union activity.  Earlier in the 
year, Benavides’ men had reported several large columns of troops leaving the 
Union-controlled city of Brownsville, including a large one on January 27, 1864, 
which “consisted of 300 Mexicans and 200 Negroes” out of a combined total of 
about 1500 troops.59  Benavides himself did not have the numbers to confront a 
force of this size, and instead kept a steady flow of messages going to Ford in 
San Antonio about their whereabouts and movements.60  Around this time, 
Benavides was presented with the opportunity to gain the rank of brigadier 
general if he could raise a brigade of troops.  Although he never did so, 
Benavides greatly desired the rank to further his prestige.  
With the Confederate fortunes in the East fading, the men of Benavides’ 
Regiment were forced ever more to look after themselves.  Again, supplies from 
Confederate sources were a necessity and Benavides was running out of money 
to buy them.  Benavides was often forced to confiscate cotton shipments and 
sell them for the supplies he needed.  In doing so, charges were leveled against 
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Benavides, saying that “he has seized cotton and sold it, after it had been 
disposed of by the agent of the Cotton Bureau.”61  The Cotton Bureau was the 
agency created by the Confederate government in Richmond to regulate cotton 
sales in hope of raising demand and forcing foreign intervention. In seizing this 
cotton, Benavides was in violation of Special Order No. 157, issued by Ford on 
June 5, 1864, that prohibited the transportation of cotton over the border into 
Mexico.62  The investigation against Benavides, while having some basis, was 
more than likely a direct result of a growing feud between Colonel Ford and 
Colonel Benavides over the prospect of Benavides being awarded a brigadier 
general’s commission.63  
For Benavides, the issue was simple: equip his men properly or face 
more mutiny and desertion like that of Adrian Vidal and his men.  His men had, 
in some cases, been poorly equipped since the beginning of the war.  The 
Benavides’ Regiment was woefully under equipped in regards to weapons. On 
January 18, 1864, Benavides wrote Major A. G. Dickinson, a commander at San 
Antonio, telling him that “there are some of the men in my command who have 
no guns.  If possible send me 50 Enfield rifles – If you have not got the Enfield 
send the best possible.”64  As of July of that same year, Benavides still had not 
received arms for his men.  In his correspondence to Ford, Benavides told him 
that “the men of Capt. Garcia’s company are without arms, and until supplied are 
of very little service.”65  Even Benavides’ men, who had thus far been loyal, 
nearly took to rioting at Ringgold Barracks while demanding new uniforms.  Only 
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the intervention of Captain Cristobal Benavides, who ordered the uniforms to be 
handed out, stopped a riot.66 
As the American Civil War neared an end in South Texas, even 
Benavides’ regiment, that had been spared thus far of a spectacle the likes of a 
Vidal-type mutiny, began deserting.67  Despite increasing desertions, Benavides 
still had ten companies in the field as of February, 1865.68  With the war ending, 
Benavides took his men out of the towns on the border, intent on keeping them 
from engaging in lawlessness.69  On June 30, 1865, Ford wrote Benavides with 
his final instructions as to how to parole his men.  Ford informed Benavides that 
General E. Kirby Smith had surrendered to Major General E. R. S. Canby on 
May 26.70  Benavides gave his officers thirty pesos each and sent them on their 
way home.71  For Santos Benavides and his men, the war of rebellion was over.  
In the end, why Tejanos fought was not a simple matter. Thompson 
argues that the Mexican Americans who fought in the war did so in an attempt to 
improve their economic or class standings.  This, however, is debatable.  In the 
various examples seen here, class does not seem as important a factor as 
Thompson makes it out to be.  In many cases, the Confederate Army was not 
paid for months at a time, and when they were paid, it was in devalued 
Confederate currency.  It could be argued that many of these men, including 
Benavides, Vidal, and even Private Garcia, fought to find a better understanding 
of if and how they belonged in American society.  Benavides and Vidal both 
came from wealthy families, and would have no reason to fight for some abstract 
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ideals of class or economics.  Instead, these leaders fought on behalf of an 
ethnicity which was considered to be inferior to their Anglo neighbors.  If, as 
Thompson argues, economics and patronage were the important reasons for 
enlisting in the opposing armies, there were, at the time, better, less risky 
alternatives to becoming soldiers.72  It is likely that the Patron system may have 
had some role, but to what extent is uncertain.  Juan Cortina and his men, being 
so active, should have been a better alternative to Tejanos looking solely for 
profit from war.  Certainly, a deserter from Cortina’s bandits would not have met 
the end that Private Garcia met.  
In the case of Adrian Vidal, he joined three different armies before facing 
a firing squad at the hands of Maximilian’s forces.  A coward, or someone 
looking only for economic benefit, would have found a different way to have 
done so without risking their lives.  Vidal, who was still a young man of twenty 
years old, and already the veteran of three armies at his death, could have just 
as easily used his stepfather’s influence to stay out of the war.73  Benavides, 
already a much older man (37 years old when the war began), almost certainly 
had more patience than Vidal. This is perhaps why Benavides never wavered 
from his loyalty to the Confederacy.  
Tejanos fighting for the Confederacy along the Rio Grande did not play a 
vital role, either in the final victory or loss of the Confederacy.  They did, 
however, provide valuable men to the Confederate government in Texas.  The 
Tejanos helped to control border raids by Bandits, Indian attacks from the west, 
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and Union incursions at Brownsville and Laredo.  For the Confederate war effort 
in Texas, the Tejanos were invaluable.  
 James McPherson contends a revolutionary tradition was drawn upon by 
both the Union and the Confederacy.  It was no different for Tejanos. Santos 
Benavides came from a family with deep roots in both martial and revolutionary 
traditions.  The same could be said for some of the men in his command.  It is 
well known that Texas and Northern Mexico was a hotbed for insurgent activity 
in revolutions against both Spain and Mexico’s Centralist government.  It was 
also in Northern Mexico where Benito Juarez launched his attacks against 
Maximillian’s Imperialist government.   
While chapter two described the events that led up to the decision to fight 
for the Confederacy, this chapter has described the wartime career of the most 
famous Tejano to join with the South in its struggle for independence.  This 
chapter has also argued that Tejano service has implications beyond what 
previous historians have written.  Here, Tejanos such as Santos Benavides took 
a positive step towards the creation of a new identity, one that identified with its 
Anglo neighbors.  Likewise, it shows that Benavides’ Anglo superior officers 
were willing to over look his ethnicity based on his service, loyalty, and 
commitment to Confederate ideals.  As historian Peter Sahlins argues, rhetoric 
is a tool that is used by border populations to begin their identification both 
toward and from a nation.74  As a Tejano in 1861 could not have conceptualized 
what the United States was in the same terms that men in Massachusetts or 
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Indiana did, they did recognize that they could use the rhetoric of the South to 
form alliances for self-protection.  Tejanos saw the American Civil War as a 
means to advance their struggle for equality and recognition as Americans.  The 
Civil War provided an opportunity for Tejanos, such as the Benavides family, to 
declare themselves interested in the internal affairs in American politics.  While 
their service remains somewhat obscure today, their efforts provided a firm 
foundation upon which a new Mexican American identity could be formed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS: GERMANS, IRISH, TEJANOS AND 
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
 
At the commencement of the Civil War, the United States was a nation of 
immigrants.  Over the course of the twenty years before the war, the United 
States saw many people come from a variety of nations.  As such, it should 
come as no surprise that many of these people quickly developed an acute 
sense of nationalism, and signed up in droves to fight for their new nation, either 
for the Union and the Confederacy.   
Following the War of 1812 with Great Britain, the United States received a 
massive influx of immigrants from the British Isles.1  This flow of immigration to 
the United States amounted to some 2,750,874 people between 1819 and 1860. 
Of these immigrants, nearly one million of them came from Ireland.2  Many Irish 
came to the shores of America to escape dire economic times in their homeland.  
Although certain events forced foreigners from their home countries to the 
United States, many of the immigrants still came willingly. 
Much like the Irish, Germans also came to the United States in search of 
a better life. As with much of Europe, the German states were devastated by the 
prolonged and bloody Napoleonic Wars. Those wars were among the first 
factors to push German immigration into Texas.3 Some came to the United 
States seeking asylum after the abortive 1848 Revolution in Germany. Others 
  73 
came both before and after the revolution seeking new lands to cultivate. By the 
beginning of the Civil War, German immigrants comprised almost one-third of 
foreign born Americans.4  As opposed to the Irish, the Germans, while also 
predominantly Catholic, were in many cases much better off in terms of 
economics and education.   
 In contrast to the Germans and Irish, many other immigrants occupied the 
new conquered lands west of the Mississippi River. The new state of Texas had 
an approximate population of 604,000.  Out of this, 23,200 people claimed 
Mexican descent.5  Following the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexicans living 
in Texas had American citizenship given to them, and their property was 
supposed to be protected by the United States Government. Almost 
immediately, Mexican Texans were excluded from many rights within the state, 
and were prohibited from entering some areas of the state, such as Austin and 
Seguin.6  To many of the Know-Nothings in Texas, the Mexican Catholic was 
both inferior to the Anglo settler and a danger to his freedom.7 
 This chapter will argue that the American Civil War provided an 
opportunity to advance the cause of Americanization by Tejanos, Germans and 
Irishmen.  In part, their participation in the war shows that there is some 
undercurrent of the formation of a national identity as German Americans, Irish 
Americans and Mexican Americans.  Aside from a few scattered German and 
Irish Immigrants before the major influx of immigrants after 1848, the Civil War 
was the first time that these ethnic groups were able to demonstrate their 
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devotion to their new nation through military service.  The wartime contributions 
of these three ethnicities can be illustrated by comparing unit records of the 
Union’s 69th New York Volunteer Infantry and the Confederacy’s Benavides 
Texas Partisan Cavalry Regiment. These two units are unique due to their ethnic 
make up, with the 69th being made up primarily of Irishmen and the Benavides 
Partisan Regiment being made up of mostly Tejanos.  The German aspect of 
this chapter will serve to place Tejanos into context as fellow settlers of 
antebellum and Civil War Texas.  As this chapter will show, Tejano and Irish 
units, fighting in vastly different environments, and under very different 
conditions, shared some important characteristics.  Apart from their relative 
location in the war, these units also had some notable points of contrast. This 
chapter will also argue that German Americans, in settling antebellum Texas, 
made many of the same adaptations and accommodating gestures that Tejanos 
did leading up to the Civil War. This chapter will also compare and contrast the 
settlement experience of Tejanos and Germans and examine their place in 
Texas society.  It will also seek to establish the nature of German acquiescence 
to or resistance against Confederate policy. Were the Germans as rebellious 
against the slaveholding South as one might expect given their abolitionist 
tendencies? 
 After arriving in the United States, German immigrants quickly found their 
points of destination, such as Texas and Missouri, and set themselves upon a 
path to create as near a mirror image of their home nation as they could. The 
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way that German immigrants settled Texas was almost a complete opposite of 
the way in which Anglos and Tejanos had cultivated the state. Far from the 
expansive southern plantations in East Texas and the ranches in South Texas, 
the German immigrants began to cultivate their land along the road from 
Galveston to Austin. Many also settled in cities and towns in Texas, rather than 
seek out farmsteads.8  
While their reception from their Anglo neighbors may have been less than 
hospitable, it was indeed more welcoming than that accorded to the Irish in New 
York or to the Tejanos in South and Central Texas. As noted before, one of the 
main points of contention between Anglo and German settlers in Texas was the 
issue of slavery.9 Likewise, the German population was more isolated than most 
other settlers. Their self-imposed seclusion and segregation from their neighbors 
only contributed to their status as outsiders.10 Many of the radical democrats 
amongst the Germans saw the slave-holding system of the South as a 
perversion of democratic ideals they had fought for in 1848.  
 Politically, Germans were more split than either the Irish or the Tejanos. 
Whereas the other two groups were clearly dominated by political figures such 
as Jose Antonio Navarro in Texas and William “Boss” Tweed in New York, the 
Germans had political factions within their community. Many Germans had 
differences of opinion on the political party that best served their needs. On one 
had, many Germans liked the southern Democratic claim of “equal rights for all 
and special privileges for none.”11 This was a small source of agreement for 
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those Germans who took particular issue with the increasingly radical 
slaveholding stance the party adopted as the election of 1860 grew closer. 
However, as with the Tejanos, the appearance of the Know-Nothings in Texas 
politics forced many Germans who considered slavery abhorrent to ally 
themselves with the Democrats in an effort to end the Know-Nothings nativist 
tendencies.12 
 To what extent the Germans in Texas were forced to follow the 
Confederate line is still a source of contention. Historians such as Gilbert 
Giddings Benjamin contend that Germans served the Confederacy as they saw 
northern Republicans as a greater threat to the Union. Others, such as Anne J. 
Bailey argue the Germans who did serve did so only to avoid confiscation of 
property and murder by angry neighbors.13 Bailey asserts that while much of the 
dissention and disloyalty occurred from native southerners, Texas Germans 
were a specific target by the state government due in large part to the public’s 
perception of them as abolitionists.14  Thus, Germans and Tejanos alike were 
sometimes the focus of legislation and public policy that isolated them and 
prohibited their interactions with slaves due to their respective ethnicity’s 
perceived abolitionist tendencies. Although many served the Confederacy 
loyally, the prevailing thought was that they were in league with slaves, and were 
not to be trusted, as is evidenced by the laws prohibiting fraternization between 
Tejanos and slaves.15  
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 The decision for Germans to fight for the Union was not always an easy 
one.  Many German Texans enlisted of their own accord to fight for the 
Confederacy.  Arguably, the same devotion and understanding of home in Texas 
that drove many Tejanos and Anglos to enlist was also present in German 
Texans.  Religion was also a contributing factor in determining what side 
Germans supported during the war. Historians Walter Kamphoefner and 
Wolfgang Helbich contend that German immigrants sided along denominational 
lines, with German Catholics and Protestants enlisting in differing numbers.  
Kamphoefner and Heblich are quick to point out that even though this may have 
effected overall enlistment of German Catholics, who largely supported the 
Union, but did not enlist in numbers as great as their Protestant countrymen, this 
had little to do with the side that they chose to fight for.16 In fact, Carl Hilmar 
Guenther, a Germain immigrant to Texas, did not believe that war was 
inevitable. Perhaps this was a reflection on his naiveté, or the feelings of 
Germans and Texans as a whole, but it showed that not all Germans were 
politically astute before the coming of the Civil War.17 
 Germans, like the Irish and Tejanos, had also felt the ire of the nativist 
Know-Nothings during the antebellum period.  While Germans came to be 
known as the bulwarks of the Republican Party and of Texas Unionism, they 
rarely stood side-by-side with their Anglo neighbors in regards to how best to 
combat secession politically. This was due in large part to the Anglo Unionist 
links with nativism.18  While the predominantly Tejano counties of South Texas 
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voted overwhelmingly in favor of secession, the German frontier counties in 
West Texas voted overwhelmingly against secession.19 German opponents of 
slavery and secession had limited options in deciding which side to fight for 
during the war. Although Germans did serve in the Texas Unionist regiments, 
they also served in Confederate Texas units.20  
When conscription came, and the choice to fight was no longer a choice 
for German Texans, a number chose to enlist to be with friends and neighbors 
rather than out of some love for the Confederacy.21 One such man was Carl 
Traugott Bauer of Round Top, Texas. Writing to his wife Lina in 1862, Bauer 
mentioned that enthusiasm for the war had already begun to fade and that there 
was little faith in victory.22 It is unclear whether Bauer was a conscript taken after 
the First Confederate Conscription in April of 1862, which might account for the 
low morale of Bauer and his men. By 1863, following the Battle of Galveston, 
Bauer confessed to his wife that he prayed for an end to the war, as all soldiers 
must, be they Confederate or Union.23 Bauer told his wife that along the Red 
River, there is much dissatisfaction, and that rumors had begun of desertions 
amongst the brigade.24 Taken in context, Bauer and Guenther show that 
amongst Texas Germans, feelings on the war differed, and many were proud to 
fight for the Confederacy or at least for their homes.25 That men in Bauer’s 
brigade began to desert shows that the men of the Benavides regiment had 
something in common, both with other Confederate units and with other ethnic 
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units. As the outcome of the war become more uncertain, the willingness to fight 
also subsided.   
 The Germans, perhaps, were a mirror image of the Tejanos. While some 
Tejanos had little ideological stake in the outcome of the Civil War, they fought 
to gain the esteem of their neighbors and to further their own assimilation into 
American society.  Tejanos who fought for the Union likely did so for the same 
motivation that drove their fellows to fight for the Confederacy. German 
immigrants who fought for the Confederacy did so more out of necessity to avoid 
property liens and harassment by neighbors.26  
While one supported slavery nearly unquestioningly, the other was torn 
by internal politics on how best to combat slavery and secession and on which 
side to serve. In many ways, the Irish men are a curious mix of both German 
and Tejano dilemmas during the Civil War, believing both in Union and in white 
supremacy and slavery.  In the middle of the eighteenth century, the Irish came 
to America for a variety of reasons.  For one, the potato blight in Ireland had 
created economic desperation and forced many to leave their homes.  Yet 
others were exiled for participating in revolutionary activities against Queen 
Victoria of Britain.  Others, like Michael Corcoran, the first wartime commander 
of the 69th New York, fled from the abortive Irish Rebellion in 1848 that occurred 
the same year as numerous other rebellions erupted across Europe.27 Corcoran 
had been enlisted in the British Revenue Police in Ireland for a brief time before 
joining the Ribbonmen, a group of guerrilla fighters.  Corcoran fled to American 
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in 1849, rather than face being caught and hung for his revolutionary activities.28  
Once Corcoran arrived in New York City, he took work at the Hibernian Hall, an 
Irish pub across the street from St. Patrick’s Cathedral.29 
 As a result of growing nativist tensions in New York, and all throughout 
the United States, Irish immigrants had been excluded from joining local militias. 
Going as far back as colonial America, the militia had often been seen as a 
social status symbol, and the exclusion of the newly arrived Irish immigrants was 
one more effort by nativists to keep the Irish alienated from American society.30  
To respond to this, the 69th New York Militia was formed in November of 1850 
as the second Irish regiment to be accepted into New York service.31 
Unbeknownst to New York society, the organizers of the 69th New York also 
intended it as a way to train men to fight against the British occupation of 
Ireland.32   Corcoran had joined the 69th early on in its history, before the unit 
was mustered into New York service.  As a testament to his ability and 
popularity, Corcoran was elected first lieutenant of I Company in the winter of 
1851.33  
 In seemingly direct contrast to the life led by Michael Corcoran was 
Patrick Cleburne. Cleburne was roughly the same age as Corcoran, but was 
born into an upper-middle class Protestant family in Northern Ireland. Historian 
Craig L. Symonds argues that even though Cleburne was a member of the 
gentry, his family still supported emancipation efforts on behalf of the lower class 
Catholic Irishmen. Like many of the men of his time, such as Corcoran or 
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Thomas Meagher, Cleburne had been active in the military before his migration 
to the United States.34  However, unlike those other two Irishmen, Cleburne was 
involved in the suppression of revolutionary activity. As a corporal, Cleburne 
served a year and a half in the 41st Foot Regiment in the British Army. Patrick 
Cleburne arrived in the United States on Christmas Day, 1849. Eighteen months 
later, he moved and settled in Helena, Arkansas.35  It is perhaps no accident 
that these three men ended up on opposite sides of the American Civil War. L
Santos Benavides, Cleburne was born into an upper-middle class household. 
While Benavides was a member of an ethnic group that was seen as unequal by 
members of his community, Cleburne was born into a family that was placed in 
charge of collecting rent from Catholic Irish peasants.  The fathers of both 
Benavides and Cleburne died early in their sons’ lives, giving Cleburne the 
impetus to immigrate and pushing Benavides into his uncle Basilio’s political 
orbit.  
ike 
 Cleburne, like Corcoran, was a figure of some controversy. Cleburne 
became the architect of a radical and drastic plan to arm slaves as soldiers for 
the Confederacy.36 Symonds believes that Cleburne was overly optimistic in his 
beliefs that the South cared more for the principles of self-governance than the 
institution of slavery.37 In the end, Cleburne gave his life for the Confederacy at 
the battle of Franklin on November 30, 1864. Symonds argues that Cleburne 
was never a part of the society for which he fought and did so perhaps more out 
of duty than a sincere belief in the cause of the Confederacy.38 If this is so, 
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Cleburne and Benavides had much in common.  Benavides fought alongside 
many who deemed him socially less than equal. Knowing this, Benavides, a 
former fugitive slave marshal, almost certainly believed in ideas of white 
supremacy and in the institution of slavery.39  
The backgrounds of Cleburne, Corcoran and Colonel Santos Benavides, 
lend themselves easily to becoming wartime leaders in the American Civil War.  
Their revolutionary and military activities had shown them both willing to fight for 
a cause. Their new nation provided them the opportunity to fight in a relatively 
short time after their incorporation into the United States.  That two foreign 
revolutionaries and a member of the Protestant Irish middle-class fought on 
opposing sides during the Civil War is not in itself extraordinary.  As shown by 
Ella Lonn in Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy, a great number of soldiers 
with combat experience had immigrated to the United States, both North and 
South, and would fight for their new nation.  Some of these men were “Forty-
eighters,” who fled Europe following the abortive 1848 revolutions, such as 
Thomas Meagher, a future commander of the Irish Brigade.40  Others who had 
joined fought for, and against, the United States in the Mexican War.  
What is most remarkable about both Corcoran and Benavides is that they 
fought for societies that had gone to extreme measures to ensure their status as 
second class citizens. As a result of Irish immigration into the United States, 
feelings of anti-immigration and anti-Catholicism culminated in the formation of 
the Know-Nothing Party. This party achieved notoriety around the nation for both 
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its secretive practices and its virulent nativism.  Irish immigrants were prevented 
from joining certain organizations, such as the militia, in response to Know-
Nothing policies. Historian Susannah Bruce argues that Catholic Irishmen fought 
for the United States out of respect for their past in Ireland and their future as 
Irish Americans.41 According to historian David R. Roediger, the whiteness of 
antebellum Irishmen was constantly called into question.42 In some places in the 
United States prior to the Civil War, Irish, and all the connotations that came with 
it, was seen by many to be as bad as being an African American Slave. As 
Roediger argues, the fact that these two groups were so often linked together in 
derogatory terms did not foster any type of solidarity. On the contrary, the Irish 
displayed an almost irrational and uncontrollable hatred towards free blacks that 
led to particularly violent flare ups between the Irish and free blacks.43  
  In many respects, the Mexican Texans faced similar, if not worse, 
conditions in what used to be their home nation.  Although far from New York, 
Mexican Texans were tormented by many of the same Know-Nothing policies 
and discriminations.  In large part, the Know-Nothings can be attributed to 
turning many Mexican Texans away from the Union and towards the Democratic 
Party.44  After the annexation of Texas, Mexican Texans found themselves 
subjected to economic harassment and exclusion from certain areas of the state.  
One of the more bloody chapters in the exclusion of Mexicans from the local 
economy resulted in the Cart Wars of 1857.  During this incident, Mexican 
carteros, or cart drivers, were targeted by their white neighbors, and had their 
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carts destroyed, cargo stolen, and in many cases, the drivers themselves 
murdered.45  During this incident, an estimated 75 Mexicans were killed.46  Only 
the intervention of the U.S. Secretary of State, the Mexican government, and 
Texas volunteer troops ended the violence.47   
The inability of many Irish and Mexican immigrants to speak the dominant 
language, English, further led to mistrust amongst communities of whites and 
immigrants. This along with the tendency of Tejanos and Irishmen to cloister 
themselves within groups of other immigrants like themselves led to the belief by 
Anglo Americans that they did not wish to become “Americanized” and adopt the 
dominant culture, which included English as the only language as well as 
conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism.  Regardless of the pre-war 
experiences of these ethnic groups, they would nonetheless enlist and fight for 
their new nation in the Civil War. In writing about the 10th Tennessee Infantry 
Regiment (Irish), historian Ed Gleeson states that the Irish had a notable lack of 
the sectional issues between North and South, and were looked down upon due 
to their accents and lack of education.48  Likewise, once Irishmen joined the 
armed forces of either the Confederacy or the Union, many were seen as 
shirkers or deserters.49 Historian Terry L. Jones cites poverty as a being the 
main impetus for Irish enlistment in Louisiana during the Civil War, and there is 
little reason to suspect that the case was very different in New York or Boston 
during the same time.50 
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On the eve of the war, Michael Corcoran, by then Colonel of the 69th 
New York, was set to stand trial for insubordination.  In October of 1860, the 
Prince of Wales, son of Queen Victoria, planned to visit New York City.  The 
69th New York had met and voted to not parade before the visiting future King of 
Britain.51  Colonel Corcoran, and many of the men of the 69th, had seen their 
refusal to parade before the Prince of Wales as a form of protest against the 
British occupation of Ireland.  This action earned Corcoran the praise of many 
Irishmen and anti-royalists all over the United States.  He received a gold 
palmetto cane from Irishmen in South Carolina, and a gold medal from Irish 
residents of San Francisco.52  However, some from his home state were 
outraged.  They asked for, and received, the convening of a court martial for 
Corcoran for charges of insubordination.  Some went so far as to ask for the 
dissolution of the 69th New York.   
Fortunately for Corcoran, events elsewhere shifted the focus off his trial.  
On April 12, 1861, secessionists in South Carolina fired on Fort Sumter in 
Charleston Harbor.  The 69th decided to answer the call for troops, despite the 
initial objection of the largely Democratic composition of the regiment.  Among 
the voices objecting to the original call for volunteers after secession was none 
other than Michael Corcoran.53  Once a vote was taken of the 69th, Corcoran 
dropped his objections, and led his men to Washington, D.C., to serve their 
initial three month stint as volunteer troops in Federal service.  The men who 
refused to enter into Federal service with the 69th were drummed out of camp 
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and humiliated by their former comrades. Once in Washington, the men set 
about building the fortification, Fort Corcoran, in honor of their commanding 
officer.54   
Shortly after their arrival in Washington, D.C., the 69th New York was 
deployed as part of General Irvin McDowell’s army. Colonel Corcoran had 
received his orders on July 12 to march out with sixty rounds of ammunition and 
three days of rations each.55  The 69th was brigaded with other units from New 
York and Wisconsin and placed under the command of Colonel William T. 
Sherman in McDowell’s First Division.  The result for the 69th was as disastrous 
for the regiment as it was for the rest of the army at the Battle of Bull Run.  In the 
chaos, the 69th lost many men, including the standard bearer, who nearly lost 
the colors of the regiment, only to have it recaptured by another unit.56  In all, the 
69th New York suffered thirty-eight men killed, fifty-nine wounded and ninety-five 
missing at Bull Run, including Colonel Corcoran, who was wounded leading his 
men from the field and taken as a prisoner of war.  In the words of David Power 
Conyngham, a staff officer who served under General Thomas Meagher in the 
Irish Brigade, “The 69th left the field in good order, with colors flying.”57  Upon 
Corcoran’s arrival at a P.O.W. camp in Richmond, his Confederate captors 
asked him to sign a parole, promising not to bear arms against the South.  He 
refused.  Corcoran was eventually exchanged, after being threatened with 
execution in retaliation for the hanging of a Confederate privateer.58  Corcoran 
received a promotion to brigadier general during his confinement.  Later, at the 
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head of his own Irish Legion, Corcoran suffered what appears to have been a 
fatal stroke and died on December 22, 1863.59 
The duration of the war produced different results for the men of the 69th 
New York Militia and the men of the Benavides Cavalry Regiment.  After the 
disaster of Bull Run, the men of the 69th New York returned home amid much 
pomp and fanfare.  Upon their arrival, many of the men re-enlisted with the 
newly renamed 69th New York Volunteer Infantry.60  This unit had in its ranks 
Irishmen from beyond the island of Manhattan.  Company K was composed of 
men from Buffalo, Company F from Brooklyn and Company D from Chicago, 
Illinois. The 69th, along with other Irish units, the 63rd New York, the 88th New 
York and the 2nd New York Artillery Battalion, were organized as the Irish 
Brigade under the leadership of a former 69th company commander, Thomas 
Meagher. 61   
Meagher was yet another former revolutionary that had settled in the 
United States following the abortive rebellion in 1848. Unlike Benavides and 
Corcoran, Meagher managed to miss most of the key revolutionary activities that 
he was charged with by the British government. Meagher had not raised arms 
against the crown or erected barricades, but was implicated in planning these 
actions.62 For his complicity in the revoution, Meagher was sentenced to exile in 
Tasmania. 63 Meagher eventually escaped Tasmania to the United States by 
paying six hundred British pounds to a ship captain.64 
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Like many Irishmen, and most notably, like Corcoran, Meagher favored 
the southern ideals and thoughts, especially concerning the right to secede and 
rebel.65 Nonetheless, Meagher joined the Union Army as part of Corcoran’s 
regiment, believing, as the colonel did, that this would serve as an opportunity to 
gain military experience for the eventual war to rid Ireland of the British. 66 For 
Meagher, his alliegance to the Union was solidified by the Confederacy firing on 
Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861.67 
Meagher previously had commanded the original K Company of the 69th, 
the New York Irish Zouaves.68  These units would be added to the II Corps 
under Edwin Sumner and, later, Winfield Scott Hancock.69  With the re-
organization of the men under the Irish Brigade, came a new philosophy on how 
they would be used in battle.  Meagher’s idea on how best to use these men 
was reflected in the choice of ordnance for them.  Meagher insisted that the men 
of the 69th, and most of the men of the Irish Brigade, be equipped with the .69 
caliber 1842 Smoothbore Musket, rather than have them equipped with the .58 
caliber Springfield Rifled-Musket.  General Meagher decided that his men would 
close with the enemy and use the shorter ranged smoothbore muskets to fire 
“buck and ball” for its advantages at close range combat.70  
Unfortunately for the men of the Irish Brigade, the tactics employed by 
Meagher led to extremely high casualty rates.  The best evidence of this was 
seen at the battle of Antietam, where according to Captain Conyngham, the men 
of the Irish Brigade, with the 69th forming on the right of the line, “the muskets 
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were become red-hot in the men’s hands, for they were three hours engaged.”71  
The men suffered greatly in their fight on that bloody day, leaving forty-four dead 
and 152 wounded, of which twenty-seven succumbed to their wounds.72 The 
69th would lose more men in the coming battles.  At the battle of Fredericksburg, 
the 69th New York, and the Irish Brigade behind them, suffered grievous losses.  
As Conyngham remembered the events, writing in 1867, “the rebel position was 
unassailable, it was a perfect slaughter-pen, and column after column was 
broken against it.”73  Colonel Robert Nugent and fifteen other officers of the 69th 
were lost, including 112 of the 173 men who crossed the Rappahannock.74  By 
February of the next year, 1863, the Irish Brigade as a whole contained only 340 
men.  When the 69th New York fought at Gettysburg, the regimental rolls 
counted only 107 men.75  Six officers and sixty-nine enlisted men died there 
during the fighting on the Stony Hill and across the Wheat Field.76  The Brigade 
was also involved in repulsing Pickett’s Charge on the third day of the battle 
where “they defiantly stood, and as the enemy closed upon them they poured a 
most destructive volley into them, contributing materially to their confusion.”77  
When the 69th New York left Virginia in early 1864, the unit consisted only of 
two companies.78  Although the 69th would rejoin the fight for the Army of the 
Potomac, it had already suffered serious losses to those who had enlisted in 
1861, which shows the extent of their loyalty to the Union cause. 
It may seem with the divergent courses of the war that the careers of the 
69th New York and the Benavides Cavalry Regiment had little in common. 
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However, some aspects of these units do lend themselves to comparison.  The 
leaders of these two units had previously fought for their home countries prior to 
the war.  Thus, these men could only loosely associate themselves with their 
new nation.  With Corcoran and Meagher, the struggle for Irish independence 
was always foremost in their thoughts.  Meagher and Corcoran were both 
Fenians who thought that Irish independence from Britain required American 
assistance.79  While Corcoran eventually encouraged Irish enlistment in the Civil 
War, he asked that Irishmen only enlist in Irish units, or else hold themselves 
back for the Fenian cause.80  While many Irishmen fought in “Mr. Lincoln’s war,” 
many of them did not support “Mr. Lincoln’s” party.  In the presidential election of 
1860, the Irish of New York overwhelmingly supported the candidacy of 
Democrat Stephen Douglas.81   
As the question of secession loomed in New York, the Irish drafted a 
resolution in favor of the Union, but against the use of force, and condemned the 
Republican Party as the “British Anti-Slavery party.”82  The Irish as a whole were 
in support of slavery. As David Roediger suggests, this may have had more to 
do with job competition from freed slaves than support for slavery itself.83 
Naturally, the fact that most Irishmen were working class in New York made 
most Irish suspicious of black freedom in the North, as they felt it threatened 
their livelihood. This dangerous undercurrent, coupled with the Irish continued 
support of the Democratic Party contributed to the eventual causes of the worst 
riot of the Civil War, the New York City draft riots of 1863.  The Irish rioters 
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attacked draft offices and those in charge of them.  Colonel Robert Nugent, hero 
of the 69th New York at the Battle of Fredericksburg, was acting provost marshal 
in charge of the draft, and as a result, had his home burnt to the ground.84  To 
his credit, Nugent had organized the draft in such a way that would keep dissent 
against the draft localized to deal with potential opposition. For this reason, 
Nugent started the drafts in the outlying areas of New York.85  Nugent also knew 
that if there was trouble, it would start in the working class Irish neighborhoods in 
the Five Points and Corlear’s Hook.86   
The most telling effect of the wartime contribution of these ethnic groups 
would be their treatment and status following the war.  Following the war, 
German Americans were widely hailed for their participation.  For the Irish their 
service was recognized, but largely ignored.  The status of the Irish following the 
war was largely the same as is it was before.  This may be in part due to their 
economic status.  Most Irish were impoverished before the war, and little was 
done to improve their status.  The Irish contributed twelve general officers to the 
war effort, as well as 7 percent of the combat troops of the war.87  This is a 
significant contribution, considering that in 1860, 13 percent of the population of 
America was born outside the borders of the nation.88  While this includes other 
Europeans and North Americans, it is still an indication of a great Irish wartime 
effort for the Union and Confederate causes.  
 In Texas, Mexican Americans contributed many fewer men to the 
struggle, but they did serve in great numbers nonetheless.  Tejanos were 
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approximately 3.8 percent of the Texas population at the time of the war.  From 
the Mexican Texan population, some 2,500 fought for the Confederacy. With the 
end of the war, the necessity of good relations between white and Mexican 
Texans ended.  While Benavides won an office as a state representative 
following the war, Mexican contributions to the American Civil war would be 
largely ignored as unimportant actions in an unimportant theater.  Their actions, 
however, suggest that Mexican Texans as a whole fought for an idea and an 
identity in a new nation, just as the Irish of New York, Louisiana and Tennessee 
did in other theaters.   
 Whereas some may see the Americanization of varying ethnic groups as 
a matter of conflict between the dominant and immigrant cultures, the actions of 
Tejanos, Germans and Irishmen during the American Civil War are testaments 
to the lengths by which immigrant cultures are willing to go to try and assimilate. 
The path towards Americanization was never an easy one, and it is hardly a 
complete one. As Peter Sahlins argues, the path to a national identity is one that 
may take centuries.89 Certainly, it has taken many years for the Irish to be 
considered as white, a classification that Tejanos have not yet attained, yet are 
not excluded from.  
The various ethnic groups that helped to define antebellum and post-war 
America, as philosopher and historian Michel Foucault has argued, created an 
identity that was important to them. Yet, even as they did this, they sought to 
become one with their new nation. Becoming American was not an easy 
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process, and the Germans, Irish and Tejanos found much resistance along the 
way. The Civil War has long been a watershed event in American history. But in 
studying the Civil War, historiography must reflect the nature of the discussions 
that were being held on the periphery of greater issues of slavery and freedom. 
The Civil War allowed for groups such as the Germans, Irish and Tejanos to 
have an active voice in what it different ethnicities believed it meant to be 
American.  
  94 
                                                
Endnotes 
 
1 Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1951; New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 2.  
2 Murray M. Horowitz, “Ethnicity and Command: The Civil War Experience,” 
Military Affairs: 42, No. 4 (Dec., 1978), 182.  
3 Gilbert Giddings Benjamin, The Germans in Texas: A Study in Immigration 
(Austin: Jenkins Publishing Company, 1974), 3. 
4 Christian B. Keller, Chancellorsville and the Germans: Nativism, Ethnicity, and 
Civil War Memory (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 10.  
5 Robert A. Calvert, et al., The History of Texas (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 
2002), 117, 126.  
6 Miguel Gonzales Quiroga, “Mexicanos in Texas During the Civil War,” Mexican 
Americans in Texas History, ed. Emilio Zamora, et al. (Austin: Texas State 
Historical Association Press, 2000), 52-54.  
7 Walter L. Buenger, Secession and the Union in Texas (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1984), 27. For other sources on the Know-Nothings in Texas and 
their impact on Tejanos, see Gregg Cantrell, “Sam Houston and the Know-
Nothings: A Reappraisal,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XCVI (Jan., 1993) 
and Roberto Ramon Calderon, “Mexican Politics in the American Era, 1846-
1900:  Laredo, Texas” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 
1993). 
  95 
                                                                                                                                                
8 Terry G. Jordan, German Seed in Texas Soil: Immigrant Farmers in 
Nineteenth-Century Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1966), 53. 
9 Benjamin, Germans in Texas, 82. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid., 95.  
12 Ibid., 102. For other implications of Know-Nothings in Texas, see Gregg 
Cantrell, “Sam Houston and the Know-Nothings: A Reappraisal,” Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, XCVI (Jan., 1993).  Cantrell examines Sam Houston’s brief 
association with the Know-Nothings in Texas during the 1850’s.  See also 
Handbook of Texas Online, s.v. “,” 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/AA/waa1.html (accessed 
June 12, 2008).  It appears as though the Know-Nothing presence in Texas was 
a grassroots movement that was sparked by xenophobic fears of German and 
Mexican settlers in the state.  
13 Anne J. Bailey, Invisible Southerners: Ethnicity in the Civil War (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2006), 22. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Frederick Law Olmsted, A Journey Through Texas: Or a Saddle-Trip on the 
Southwestern Frontier (New York:  Edward Dix, 1857; reprint, Lincoln:  
University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 272.  
  96 
                                                                                                                                                
16 Walter Kamphoefner and Wolfgang Heblich, Germans in the Civil War: The 
Letters They Wrote Home (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2006), 7. 
17 Carl Hilmar Guenther, An Immigrant Miller Picks Texas: The Letters of Carl 
Hilmar Guenther, translated by Regina Beckmann Hurst and Walter D. 
Kamphoefner (San Antonio: Maverick Publishing Company, 2001), 86.  
18 Walter Kamphoefner, “New Perspectives on Texas Germans and the 
Confederacy,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Volume CII, No. 4 (April, 
1999), 444. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 448-449.  
21 Ibid., 449. 
22 Carl Traugott Bauer to Lina Bauer, December 15, 1862, Carl Bauer Papers, 
Texas State Archives, hereafter referred to as Bauer Papers, TSA.  
23 Carl Traugott Bauer to Lina Bauer, April 2, 1863, ibid.  
24 Carl Traugott Bauer to Lina Bauer, May 2, 1863, ibid. 
25 As we can see with Bauer’s letters, Confederate Germans did take pride in 
their service to their homes and to the Confederacy. As with the Benavides 
regiment’s desertions, German desertions most likely had to do with the 
increasingly dire straits of the Confederacy and the lack of supplies and support.  
26 Bailey, Invisible Southerners, 16.  
  97 
                                                                                                                                                
27 Phyllis Lane, “Colonel Michael Corcoran: Fighting Irishman of the Irish 
Brigade,” The History of the Irish Brigade, ed. Phillip Thomas Tucker 
(Fredericksburg, VA: Sergeant Kirkland’s Museum and Historical Society, Inc., 
1995), 72.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 73.  
30 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 15.  
31 Lane, “Colonel Corcoran,” 74.  
32 Mahon, History of the Militia, 86. 
33 Susannah Ural Bruce, The Harp and the Eagle: Irish American Volunteers and 
the Union Army, 1861-1865 (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 49. 
34 Craig L. Symonds, Stonewall of the West: Patrick Cleburne and the Civil War 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 12.  
35 Ibid., 26-27.  
36 Ibid., 186-187.  
37 Ibid., 181.  
38 Ibid., 263.  
39 Jerry D. Thompson, Vaqueros in Blue & Gray (Austin: Presidial Press, 1977; 
reprint, Austin: State House Press, 2000), 12. 
40 Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army, 202.  
41 Bruce, Harp and the Eagle, 2. 
  98 
                                                                                                                                                
42 David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the 
American Working Class (New York: Verso, 1991, 2003), 133.  
43 Ibid., 136.  
44 Buenger, Secession, 134. 
45 Quiroga, “Mexicanos in Texas During the Civil War,” 53.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Calvert, History of Texas, 126.  
48 Ed Gleeson, Rebel Sons of Erin: A Civil War Unit History of the Tenth 
Tennessee Infantry Regiment (Irish) Confederate States Volunteers 
(Indianapolis: Guild Press of Indiana, 1993), 10-11. 
49 Terry L. Jones, Lee’s Tigers: The Louisiana Infantry in the Army of Northern 
Virginia (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), xii.  
50 Ibid., 7. Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New York: Routledge 
Press, 1995), 2. According to Ignatiev, the Irish were often given the most 
dangerous jobs, as they could be replaced cheaper than slaves. The districts 
inhabited by the Irish in New York, Boston and other eastern cities were 
renowned for their squalor, crime and poverty.  
51 Lane, “Colonel Michael Corcoran,” 77.  
52 Ibid., 79.  
53 William L. Burton, “‘Title Deed to America’: Union Ethnic Regiments in the Civil 
War,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Volume 124, No.6 
(Dec. 17, 1980), 459.  
  99 
                                                                                                                                                
54 Mahon, History of the Militia, 98. 
55 Joseph G. Bilby, Remember Fontenoy!: The 69th New York and the Irish 
Brigade in the Civil War (Hightstown, NJ: Longstreet House, 1995), 9.  
56 Ibid., 17.  
57 David Power Conyngham, The Irish Brigade (New York: William McSorley & 
Co., 1867; Gaithersburg, MD: Olde Soldier Books, Inc., 1990), 40.  
58 Lane, “Colonel Corcoran,” 82.  
59 Ibid., 92.  
60 Bilby, Remember Fontenoy!, 19.  
61 Ibid., 22.  
62 Paul R. Wylie, The Irish General: Thomas Francis Meagher (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), 58.  
63 Ibid., 66.  
64 Ibid., 80.  
65 Ibid., 118-119.  
66 Ibid., 119.  
67Ibid., 119.   
68 Bilby, Remember Fontenoy!, 7, 20.  
69 Ibid., 53.  
70 Ibid., 33.  
71 Conyngham, The Irish Brigade, 306.  
72 Bilby, Remember Fontenoy!, 60.  
  100 
                                                                                                                                                
73 Ibid., 343.  
74 Bilby, Remember Fontenoy!, 70.  
75 Ibid., 91.  
76 Ibid.  
77 Conyngham, The Irish Brigade, 419.  
78 Bilby, Remember Fontenoy! 98.  
79 Horowitz, “Ethnicity and Command,” 187.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 186.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Roediger, Wages of Whiteness, 76-77. 
84 Bilby, Remember Fontenoy!, 92.  
85 Iver Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots: Their Significance for American 
Society and Politics in the Age of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 13. 
86 Adrian Cook, The Armies of the Streets: The New York City Draft Riots of 
1863 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1974), 54. 
87 Horowitz, “Ethnicity and Command,” 182, 188.  
88 Ibid., 182. 
89 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 269. 
  101   
CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION- “ESTA SANGUINA GUERRA”: THE END OF THE 
ANGLO TEJANO ALLIANCE 
 
 Antonio Bustillo, an enlisted soldier from San Antonio serving with the 6th 
Texas Volunteers near Dalton, Georgia with Cleburne’s Division, wrote in March 
of 1864, “Everyone assures me that this bloody war will be over in the coming 
year.”1  He concluded, “I very much wish to see you all again, for it has been 
nearly two years that I have been absent from my home.”2 While those who 
served in south Texas no doubt were less apt to the home sickness that Private 
Bustillo showed, many still endured four years of hardship in their service to the 
Confederacy. Even as the enlistees of 1861-1862 continued to serve honorably, 
the enthusiasm had long since worn off, replaced by a desire only to return 
home. The sentiments expressed by Bustillo in his letter could have just as 
easily been those of many German, Irish or Anglo soldiers. 
With the surrender of Confederate forces under Edmund Kirby Smith, the 
Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi ended on May 26, 1865.3  Along with the end 
of the war, hopes for Tejano inclusion into Texas society and life also had been 
placed on hold.  While Santos Benavides and his brothers remained fixtures in 
Laredo politics for years to come, Anglo Texan attitudes towards Tejanos 
reverted to their antebellum position. For a large majority of Tejanos the wartime 
political expediency of the Anglo-Tejano alliance was over.  
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 The steps for Tejano assimilation into Texan culture which began before 
Texas gained its independence from Mexico by men such as Juan Seguin and 
Jose Antonio Navarro had carried on past annexation, War with Mexico, and 
secession.  Aided by a national debate over the nature of immigrants, Tejanos 
had, in part, found shelter within the Democratic Party.4  The Democrats, in 
allowing the inclusion of Irish and Tejano immigrants into the party, had 
consolidated their control over immigrant groups in hope of maintaining their 
hold both on the South and the institution of slavery.  While it is true that many 
Tejanos had no interest in maintaining slavery in Texas, they, like some 
Germans, had accepted this tenet of the Democratic Party in order to gain 
acceptance into Texan society.5  
 The creation of a Mexican Texan identity was well underway by the time 
Fort Sumter was fired upon.  Acceptance into the Democratic Party was only 
one step in the creation of this identity.  Prominent Tejano families, such as the 
Navarro, Seguin and Benavides families, not only socialized with prominent 
Anglo families, but also in many cases intermarried.  In Mexican Texas, where a 
strong national identity had not been established by either Spain or Mexico 
before 1835, national identity was negotiable and fluid.  According to Peter 
Sahlins, national identity is a negotiable characteristic that groups along national 
frontiers often adopt in self-interest.6  That the northern provinces of Mexico and 
Spain had so often been seats of rebellion further supports this view.  
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 In his provocative book For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in 
the Civil War, James McPherson asserts that the men who fought for the Union 
and Confederacy did so based on previous revolutionary traditions, amongst 
other things.7  This is certainly true for the German “Forty-Eighters,” the Irish 
exiles from the Famine, and the Tejano rebels against the Centralist government 
in Mexico. That Tejanos such as the Navarro and Benavides families took an 
active part in the Confederacy should come as no surprise, any more than the 
involvement of ethnic Irish such as Thomas Meagher and Michael Corcoran on 
the Federal side.  Part of the negotiation of identity between Tejanos and Anglos 
involved the Tejanos accepting of American cultural mores, which in the South 
included acceptance of the system of slavery. In Noel Ignatiev’s influential book 
How the Irish Became White, the author argues that the alliance between the 
Democratic Party and the Irish was an alliance of convenience, which rejected 
nativism as championed by the Know-Nothings, and then the Republican Party, 
in favor of an institutional form of racism.8   This assertion is one that is very 
close in nature to the reason that Tejano elites allied themselves with the 
Democrats.  While there is evidence, as reported by Frederick Olmsted, that a 
certain degree of camaraderie, or a “culture of the low,” as described by 
Ignatiev, existed between Texas slaves and Tejanos, the same author reports of 
the brutal treatment of slaves at the hands of Tejano masters.9  
 The wartime experience of Santos Benavides and his Tejano soldiers 
does much to show the extent of dedication to the Texan and Confederate 
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causes.  The identity that was adopted by Tejanos was a reflection of the men 
and women who lived around them.  The governments and policies in 
Washington and Richmond had little to do with the day-to-day lives of the 
Tejanos who served with Santos Benavides, and antagonistically, with Union 
General Edmund J. Davis.  Nonetheless, traditional scholarship that treated the 
men of the Benavides Partisan Cavalry Regiment and the 1st and 2nd Texas 
(Union) as little more than hirelings no longer appears viable. While there was 
higher than average desertion rates among some of the units composed of 
Tejanos, many units composed of Anglos had similar desertion rates when faced 
with little or no pay and unsatisfactory provisions and equipment.  The 
Benavides Regiment, which was manned by a majority of the Tejanos who 
served with the Confederacy, still had ten companies of troops in the field as of 
the surrender of the Trans-Mississippi Army under General Edmund Kirby 
Smith.10  
 The Tejanos’ service to the Confederacy, while certainly not important in 
the way that many of the famous Confederate regiments were, still served an 
important function and may be taken to demonstrate unexpected racial 
acceptance by Anglo Confederates, at least within nineteenth century racial 
attitudes. Before the interdiction of the Mississippi River in July of 1863 by Union 
forces, Texas, and its southern border, were lifelines of supplies in to the 
Confederate Southwest.  The Tejano units along the Rio Grande allowed 
supplies to escape the predation of Juan N. Cortina and his bandits.  As shown 
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by the Benavides Regiment’s involvement in the Battle of Laredo, Tejano units 
also helped to defend the interior of the state.  The true legacy of the Benavides 
Cavalry Regiment’s combat service to the Confederacy is therefore at the local 
level.  On the other hand, the regiment’s military service may be interpreted as 
less significant than the exceptional steps toward social acceptance of the 
Tejanos by Anglo Confederates. 
 The American Civil War had numerous implications as far as ethnicity and 
Americanization.  The Irish, while not seen as a part of the dominant Anglo 
ethnicity, were still considered white, if only just barely.  Officers like Thomas 
Meagher and Michael Corcoran came from a very different tradition than those 
like Santos Benavides and Patrick Cleburne. While Meagher, Corcoran and 
Benavides are linked together by virtue of having fought as revolutionaries, their 
class still separated them.  Meagher and Corcoran came from a different class 
background than Benavides and Cleburne.  The latter two officers came from an 
middle class background, and this no doubt played a part in the way they chose 
their ultimate alliance with the Confederacy.  
 Walter Kamphoefner and Wolfgang Helbich assert in their book Germans 
in the Civil War: The Letters They Wrote Home, that Germans were hardly a 
homogenous group in their opposition or support of slavery.11  Those Germans 
who entered the United States before the revolution of 1848 were more apt to 
settle in areas which had slaves and were thus more likely to accept slavery. 
Ignatiev argues that the Irish, while traditionally opposed to slavery, found 
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common cause with the Democrats in opposing the Republican Party’s nativist 
and anti-Catholic attitudes.  Tejanos were confronted with the same issues after 
the initial success of the Know-Nothings in Texas during the mid-1850’s. 
Traditional scholarship has ignored the commonalities between the various 
ethnic groups that fought for both sides during the Civil War and this thesis 
concludes that models for the service of one ethnic group, such as the Irish and 
Germans, should be extended to other, more obscure groups, such as the 
Tejanos, to test the theory of service and Americanization.  
 Accommodation to the dominant culture of America has been an issue for 
immigrant groups since before the United States was independent from 
England. With the massive influx of immigrants in the nineteenth century, this 
issue was once again brought to the forefront.  That most Irish were poor and 
most could not settle past the port cities made them all the more wretched in the 
eyes of American born Anglos.  Similarly, Tejanos along the Rio Grande were 
attacked due to the perception that they took jobs from lower class Anglo 
settlers.  When emancipation was announced in 1862, the backlash against free 
blacks took a very similar form, as evidenced by the New York Draft Riots of 
1863. Similar in feel, if not in scope, to the Cart Wars of the 1850’s in Texas, an 
ethnic group was singled out due to the perceived increase in job competition.  
 While men such as Benavides and Cleburne had little to fear in this 
regard, many of the men who served with them did not enjoy similar economic 
prosperity.  According to the U.S. Census records on 1850 and 1860 listed many 
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of the men who served with Benavides as ranch workers or other types of 
unskilled labor. Meanwhile, Benavides and many of his officers were wealthy by 
comparison, having their occupations listed as various types of merchants and 
landowners.  An example of this is Captain H. Clay Davis, commander of H 
company of the Benavides Cavalry Regiment, owned more than $25,000 worth 
of real property in 1850.12 The traditional interpretation of Tejano service does 
include a heavy emphasis on economics.  Jerry Thompson, in his book 
Vaqueros Blue and Gray, contends that Tejanos enlisted to enhance their 
economic opportunities.  However, as shown by Miguel Gonzales Quiroga in his 
article “Mexicanos in Texas During the Civil War,” Tejanos were not subject to 
the Confederate conscription laws.13  Economic opportunities were not limited to 
the Confederate or Union armies. Rather, with trade to Mexico booming during 
this time, that might have seemed a better, and somewhat more comfortable 
trade to engage in.  
 Traditional scholarship has also cited Santos Benavides himself as a 
major source of enlistment of Tejanos.  Again, the social and economic 
prominence of Benavides may have explained the number of Tejanos from 
Laredo that joined, since the Benavides family had been an influential one as far 
back as the founding of the town. However, the Benavides Cavalry Regiment 
had members from as far north as Austin, and as far west as New Mexico.  The 
geographic area from which the Benavides Cavalry Regiment recruited was 
impressive, and Benavides’ reputation before the war could not have drawn in 
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so many.  The Benavides Cavalry Regiment was not a homogenous group. Both 
Tejanos and Anglos served under Benavides.  Anglos served under Benavides 
as officers and enlisted men.  This can be interpreted as a sign of Anglo 
acceptance of a Tejano as a competent officer.  In the Benavides Cavalry 
Regiment, many Tejanos were given positions of prominence, from Captains of 
half of the companies to various non-commissioned officer positions within the 
units themselves.14  Praise given to Benavides by the Governor of Texas and 
his Anglo commanding officers shows that his ethnicity, for a time, was not an 
issue.  Again, the attraction of a Tejano officer would not have drawn such a 
diverse group.  Rather, traditional explanations of enlistment, such as patr
concern for home and the aforementioned revolutionary spirit appear to have 
combined prompting Tejanos to rally for the Confederacy.
iotism, 
15  
 While the Civil War doubtless left a legacy on Texas, its legacy on 
Tejanos has been significantly more difficult to determine.  The Tejanos who 
served either the Confederacy or the Union were like many immigrants before 
them, and since, in having little ability to read and write English.  Regardless, 
Tejanos enlisting voluntarily for the Confederacy under some harsh conditions 
indicates multiple motivations were at work.  Again, incidents like Adrian Vidal’s 
repeated defections and desertions cast doubts on the dedication of Tejano 
troops to either side.  Vidal was a young man when his desertion occurred, and 
was the result of chronic neglect by both the Confederacy and the Union.  This 
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cannot be taken as a reflection on the dedication of Tejano troops any more than 
the patriotism of Germans after their retreat at Chancellorsville, Virginia.  
 Tejanos, Germans, and the Irish ultimately decided to fight for the side 
they thought best represented their vision of America.  In some cases, it was for 
a more perfect Union, complete with ideals of freedom and equality.  To others, 
it was ideals of home and the need simply to belong in a state and regional 
setting. While other ethnic groups left more complete records of their reasons for 
fighting in the American Civil War, scholars who study Tejanos draw conclusions 
from the incomplete records of why these men who had little or no stake in the 
war’s outcome fought as they did and for who they did.  While Tejanos wrote 
and spoke differently than their contemporaries, they nonetheless vocalized 
sentiments that would be understood by soldiers in either army during the war.    
While they were unique in their position of being Tejano and Confederate, much 
still tied them to their fellow soldiers of any ethnicity.  
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